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1. THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION
Neuroscientic approach to psychodynamic description in its historical origin has 
been proposed by Freud (1895) in his “Project of scientific psychology”. In princi-
ple this “Project” is focused on relationship between psychoanalysis and neurosci-
ence with the aim to study relations of the nervous system with conscious and un-
conscious mental phenomena described within the framework of psychoanalytic 
theory. Basic postulate of this concept is that psychoanalytic explanations and in-
terpretations of mental phenomena refer to processes that may be described using 
language of neuroscience, physics and other scientific disciplines as originally 
Freud emphasized and other authors proposed (Beutel et al., 2004; Edelson, 1986; 
Schore, 1997; Kandel, 1999; Solms, 1997; Westen and Gabbard, 2002a, 2002b; 
Yovell, 2000). 
In this context, Solms proposed the concept of neuropsychoanalysis (Solms 
and Saling, 1986; Solms, 2004; Solms and Turnbull, 2011; Panksepp and Solms,
2012). The neuro-psychoanalytical concept develops substantial links between 
Freud's neurological and psychoanalytic ideas and suggests that both sciences 
may collaborate on issues of common interest (Solms and Saling, 1986). This 
neuropsychoanalytical concept is based on biological descriptions of the brain that 
in principle might be connected with Freud’s psychological theories and in clinical 
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practice may provide integration of psychotherapy with psychoactive medications 
in agreement with current brain imaging data which show that “talk therapy” af-
fects the brain in similar ways as psychoactive drugs (Solms, 2004). Based on 
modern concepts, neuropsychoanalysis is aimed to understand the human mind 
and especially its relationship to first-person perspective of subjective experience 
that in principle may be linked to processes in the human brain but its existence 
cannot be reduced only on information processing in neural networks and has 
specific dynamics that is called ‘mind’ (Panksepp and Solms, 2012). In this context, 
historical foundations of neuropsychoanalysis are closely linked to discussion of 
the basic philosophical concepts in this field that seem to be mainly focused on 
dual-aspect monism which in principle may present a new “school” of psychoa-
nalysis (Solms and Turnbull, 2011).
In the current psychoanalytical thinking the “neuro-viewpoint” related to du-
al-aspect monism presents interesting and controversial issue and may be misun-
derstood as neural reductionism that has been repeatedly a subject of psychoana-
lytic criticism (Pulver, 2003; Vivona, 2009; Talvitie and Ihanus, 2011). In this con-
text some authors pointed out on limits and clinical insignificance of neuroscience 
for psychoanalysis simply because “we cannot analyse human experience in 
neuroscientific terms” (Blass and Carmeli, 2007, p. 36). 
On the other hand, there is a valid assumption that using neuroscience for de-
scription of psychoanalytic phenomena may help to study relationships between 
psychological and neuroscientific viewpoints without reductionism (Talvitie and 
Ihanus, 2011). Talvitie and Ihanus (2011) suggested that this purpose could be 
possible to achieve within the framework of “neuropsychoanalysis” based on du-
al-aspect monism that could be understood as an “interfield” theory providing 
unifying knowledge connecting both fields and viewpoints. Connections between 
both fields as related to objectively conceptualized scientific view may be based on 
“circular causality” principle that explains causal chain of phenomena in the field
of mind and in the field of physiological events but also interfield causality which 
may describe a physiological change due to an event in the mind and vice versa. 
For example, conversion of a stressful event and intrapsychic conflict into somatic 
symptoms, behavioral disorders or seizures and on the contrary there is evidence 
that somatic disturbances influence the mind. In this context, it is possible to sup-
pose that a neural event has its representation on conscious or unconscious mental 
level and vice versa.  
With respect to the concept of causality between mind and brain, it is possible 
to suppose that both structures in principle reflect each other and are isomorphic 
with respect to general principles of mathematics, in which isomorphism is stud-
ied in order to extend insights from one phenomenon to another. In fact, if two ob-
jects are isomorphic, then any property described in scientific description of one 
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
9
phenomenon is on a different “isomorphic” level valid for the objects in another 
descriptive domain (Marker, 2002; Mazur, 2008). Based on definition of isomor-
phism this problem is well defined in mathematics for scientific  description of ob-
served natural process in which the “same” object can be presented to us in differ-
ent ways as for example “wave-particle dualism” in physics representing typical 
example of dual-aspect monism in scientific description of physical phenomena. 
Applied to experimental work in science isomorphic description means that if 
an isomorphism can be found between some fields in which many theorems are 
already proved and is possible to describe analogies between those fields then 
they in principle may be linked to a kind of “superobject” or superstructure that 
underlies both of them and represents their conceptual unity in duality. In this 
context, even when the super-object is presented to us by two different ways and 
enables two different descriptions, there is a potential description that enables to 
consider both of them as equal and isomorphic. On this level of general abstrac-
tion we must separate a general quality connecting both descriptions and find 
how this general quality is specifically reduced to create the first one or the second
descriptive level.
In the specific general description of the mind-brain relationship it means that 
mind cannot be fully understood using description of its brain, and on the contra-
ry, mind theory may not provide description of brain phenomena even if in cer-
tain conditions, mind may be significantly determined by events in its brain. Both 
phenomenological levels of description, mind and the brain, have coupled internal 
dynamic structures that are mutually related and causally influenced. In fact it 
means that structure as a pattern of relations on various levels of organization cre-
ates a system organized by these characteristic patterns of its defined components 
and creates dynamic and metastable structural changes that define dynamics of 
the system during the time. Based on this principle, brain as well as mind, may be 
defined on a principle of structural patterns of relations that are created by its 
basic defined components. These components may be described by language of 
physics and chemistry describing creation of various chemical and biological ag-
gregates in the brain and relations between them are essentially understood as in-
formation flows between various levels of the system components.
With respect to current findings there is a basic dilemma whether structural 
“disorder” in the biological system that specifically may emerge as mental or 
physical disease presents only increased randomness in the system as a response 
to injurious stimuli or presents specific and different level of organization of its 
components that is not random and present “meaningful response” of the self-
organizing system to these stimuli. This problem seems to be critical for psycho-
analytical viewpoint because when a mental disorder is only a transition increas-
ing randomness in the mind then this pathological process is physically and bio-
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logically determined. Historically this dilemma is contained in basic principles of 
psychoanalysis proposed by Freud (1895). Based on his scientific and therapeutic 
experience Freud proposed that even if mental disorder may be seen as an in-
creased randomness of mental processing, in fact this randomness is caused by 
intrapsychic conflict, which determines that some mental aggregates that are inte-
grated in healthy state of mind may be pathologically disintegrated. 
This Freud’s original viewpoint suggests that psychoanalysis as a theory is not 
reductionistic and in principle it has important theoretical elements that are also 
contained in modern theories of self-organizing systems which implicate that in-
creased randomness and disorder in the system lead to different relations of sys-
tem components. On the other hand, self-organizing rearrangement and re-
patterning of system components implicates increased disorder and random-like 
behavior in the system. The concept of self-organizing system is in principle in 
agreement with current neuroscientific evidence that mental disorder may be in-
duced by injurious stimuli from the outside world like chemical substances or var-
ious biological or physical influences that increase randomness in the brain and 
mental system and may cause relational changes of its components. On the other 
hand mental disease may be induced by information overload leading to confu-
sion and increased randomness in mental processing as well as painful and trau-
matic experiences affecting mental components and structural patterns of the hu-
man mind (Breakspear, 2006; Bob, 2008) that lead to psychological conflict and 
mental disintegration which may cause physiological and morphological brain 
abnormalities (Teicher et al., 2006; Bremner et al., 2007).    
In this context, main purpose of this theoretical introduction is to show that 
current psychoanalytical and some neuroscientific theories of schizophrenia pre-
sent isomorphic descriptions of the disease that in both descriptions in principle 
may be understood as a disorder of mental and neural unity leading to disintegra-
tion of consciousness and on the other hand as cognitive disorder due to increased 
randomness in mental and brain processing leading to disturbances in cognitive 
functions which in an extreme case may cause loss of differentiation between self 
and non-self.          
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1.1. SPLITTING IN SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A DISCONNECTION
IN THE MIND
The term splitting can be defined as a forming of mental aggregates of incompati-
ble experiences that cannot be synthesized (Freedman, 1980). Freud and Breuer 
(Breuer, 1893) defined splitting process as a division in mental apparatus and as a 
split of different psychic groupings or ego nuclei, for example due to post-
hypnotic suggestion, hypnoid states, multiple personality disorder or somnambu-
lism (Freedman, 1980; Breuer, 1893). The process of splitting creates “…nucleus 
and center of crystallization for the formation of a psychical group divorced from 
ego” (Breuer, 1893, p. 123). 
1.1.1. Splitting of the Mind
Characteristic description of the splitting suggested Freud (1912), who proposed 
that as a consequence of splitting consciousness “…oscillates between the two dif-
ferent psychic complexes, which became conscious and unconscious in alterna-
tion” (Freud 1912, p.262) and found that the splitted mental representations relat-
ed to emotional memories may be linked to a real trauma in infancy (Freedman, 
1980). 
In this context, may be defined “splitting of representations” and character-
ized by disaggregation of mental images and semantic descriptions of objects, 
events and the self, for example splitting of one object into two images – ”good” 
one and ”bad” one (Freud, 1915a; Brook, 1992). Following Freud’s  view (1915a, p. 
135-136) later psychoanalytical concept proposed by Klein (1946; Lerner and Ler-
ner, 1982) explained splitting as a consequence of a defense mechanism against 
destructive impulses within the self (Bychowski, 1956; Klein, 1946, p.101) through 
the process of projective identification that using projective mechanism transfers 
inacceptable parts of the mind into another person (Hinshelwood, 2008, p.510-
516). 
Developmental context in “splitting of representations” was elaborated by 
Kernberg (1982), who developed original Freud’s postulates (1938, p.149) on ego 
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differentiation and its development from an undifferentiated ego-id structure. 
Kernberg developed a concept in which primarily undifferentiated self-object rep-
resentation is structured through two contradictory sets of relatively independent 
memory traces related to pleasurable-good-rewarding and painful-bad-punishing 
experiences (Kernberg, 1982). Based on these tendencies, experiencing of object’s 
contradictory qualities [“all good” or “all bad”] is linked to undifferentiated self-
object representations. In later stages of development these contradictory tenden-
cies may be distinguished and differentiated through interrelated processes of 
exteroception and interoception that enable to create inner and outer boundaries 
and differentiate between self and non-self (Kernberg, 1982; Lichtenberg and Slap, 
1973). 
In this context, differentiative processes related to splitting also may have 
adaptive functions, “…by which the ego organizes its participation in experience –
essentially the early capacity to represent, distinguish between, and categorize ex-
treme states” (Lustman, 1977, p.121). In that manner, splitting may be understood 
as a developmental precursor of repression and defensive mechanisms, reflecting 
undeveloped ego’s synthetic functions such as primitive idealization, projective 
identification, denial and omnipotence/devaluation mechanisms (Kernberg, 1975; 
Lerner and Lerner, 1982; Lustman, 1977; Hinshelwood, 2008). 
Using splitting processes, defense mechanisms lead to formation of relatively 
autonomous independent units within the self. For example, Fairbairn (1941) pro-
posed that psyche is organized through relational structures coupled to the pro-
cess of introjection based on a process of internal adoption of certain parts of oth-
ers mind (Sharf and Birles, 1997). The “relational structures” were comprehensive-
ly described by Glover using his ontogenetic concept of primitive ego nuclei. Glov-
er suggested that the infant psychic structure is multinuclear and consists of psy-
chic ego-nuclei representing innate predispositions of relations between self and 
intentional objects (Glover, 1943, 1961). In this context, the ego-nucleus functions 
as a ‘miniature ego’ that during development of psychic apparatus and its syn-
thetic functions creates relations to other nuclei.  This process enables organization 
of the nuclei into coherent psychic structures. However, under stress the ego tends 
to regression and splits again, and distinct ego nuclei are expressed via previous 
early conflicts and fixations. In this context, Glover suggested the term “nuclea-
tion” for the process when a coherent structure breaks down into separated and 
relatively isolated nuclei forming dissociated mental structures (Glover, 1943). 
Similarly, Bromberg later proposed existence of many self-states in the mind 
that all have a capability of subjective quality of “I” (Bromberg, 1995, 2003, 2009). 
According to Bromberg, transitions between individual self-states are subjectively 
experienced as continuous and create an illusion of one “I-ness”. In this context, 
healthy mind has a certain ability to “stand in spaces” between the self-states 
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(Bromberg, 2009, p.643). On the contrary, Stern (2004, 2009) proposed that patho-
logically disintegrated self-states may be characterized by splitting between ordi-
nary experiences and “unformulated” experience that are conflicting and “unac-
ceptable”. 
Basic description of the splitting process has been proposed by Kohut (1971, p. 
240), who suggested that in principle it is possible to define distinctions between 
horizontal splitting (repression) and vertical splitting (the splitting proper). In the 
horizontal splitting repressed material is different from unrepressed and content 
of the split exist on “vertical” axis (e.g. in terms of rawness of affect) while in ver-
tical splitting the split of content exists on the same level on “horizontal” axis, for 
example represented as “ego nuclei” (Lustman, 1977; Garfield, 2005; Hinshel-
wood, 2008; Stern, 2004). Both processes define clear differences in which horizon-
tal splitting (repression) allows substitutions by other representations, while verti-
cal splitting results to ego fragmentation (Hinshelwood, 2008). The concept 
of splitting in general on its various levels leads to a separation of mental group-
ings that creates relatively autonomous psychic structures due to reduction of 
the synthetic and integrative capabilities in order to protect mind against conflict-
ing processes within mental apparatus.
1.1.2. Splitting of the Mind in Schizophrenia
Systematic description of splitting— as a form of dissolution— based on psycho-
dynamic approach was suggested by Bleuler (1911/1950) in his monograph ‘De-
mentia praecox or the group of schizophrenias’. In this groundbreaking work Bleuler 
described basic forms of splitting in schizophrenia as a consequence of disturbed 
associations. According to Bleuler, the first form of this process represents associa-
tive splitting or “loosening of associations”, when normal pathways of associations 
have decreased their ”cohesiveness”, which leads to displacements, condensa-
tions, confusions, generalizations, clang-associations, illogical thinking and inco-
herence. The second form of splitting is related to splitting of psychic functions,
when complex psychic structures disintegrate due to emotionally charged com-
plexes that become isolated and independent. 
Specific form of the splitting in psychosis may occur in cases, when a patient’s 
mind is split off into ‘many different persons’. This splitting of the mind likely may 
occur due to a lack of inhibition of normal associative links (Bion, 1957; Katan, 
1954) in which the ego changes it’s links to one or another of the individual com-
plexes (Bleuler 1911/1950, p.381). In this context, Bleuler in 1911 proposed the 
term ‘schizophrenia’, instead of ‘dementia praecox’ and thought that: “…the ’split-
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ting’ of the different psychic functions is one of its most important characteristics” 
(Bleuler 1911/1950, p.8). According to Bleuler (1911/1950) some psychic complex-
es may dominate personality structure, while other complexes are “split off” and 
operate as fragments connected with the others in an ”illogical” way. Similarly 
described personality structure also Jung (1909), who proposed that associations 
are linked to complex mental aggregates that connect emotional, episodic and se-
mantic memories. 
According to Bleuler (1911/1950) associative forms of splitting are related to 
distorted relations between associations and affectivity due to weakened logical 
functions and abnormally facilitated affects. Bleuler’s concept of splitting in schiz-
ophrenia was historically linked to psychoanalysis (Falzeder, 2007). In this con-
text, Freud’s thinking on schizophrenia (Freud, 1896; 1911) was conceptualized as 
continuity between schizophrenia and neurosis in which traumatic developmental 
factors of schizophrenia are quite similar to neurosis. Typically, an intrapsychic 
conflict and primitive defense (projection, disavowal) may play a role in devel-
opment of ego weakness, regression of ego functions. Moreover, prevailing con-
flicts connected with aggressive impulses predetermine an increased severity of 
the disease and schizophrenic symptoms (delusions, hallucinations) (London, 
1973; Grotstein, 1977b). In later Freud’s work “On Narcissism: An Introduction” 
(Freud 1914, p.74-86) he suggested that psychosis is mainly characterized by ‘in-
tentional disappointment’ that represents libido withdrawal from people and 
things in the external world which is not replaced in phantasy by other ‘intention-
al expectations’ (i.e. libido investment). This process is typically related to instinc-
tual arousal (i.e. free energy) that cannot be ‘bound’ or ‘released’ and results to 
psychic dissolution (i.e. splitting), and ‘innervates’ ideational complexes that cha-
otically enter into consciousness. (Freud, 1914; 1915b, p.203; Novey, 1958; Free-
man, 1997, p. 39). Based on this approach Freud (1923) postulated that basic aspect 
of schizophrenia represents a conflict between the ego and external reality that 
leads to defense mechanisms related to preservation of the ego identity against 
mental fragmentation.  
The concept of schizophrenia as a psychical condition related to similar mech-
anisms like in neurosis was later elaborated by Klein (1946) and Rosenfeld (1947). 
According to this concept, schizophrenia represents fixation of paranoid schizoid 
position, in which primitive defense mechanisms as splitting [in a sense of split-
ting of representations], projective identification and introjective identification 
likely play a major role (Klein, 1946). Later Rosenfeld (1947) proposed that projec-
tive identification may be excessive, and may cause that parts of ego are split off 
and projected into other persons with resulting restriction of thinking and behav-
ioral patterns. Similarly, Bion (1957) wrote about “splitting attacks“, in which a 
person splits internal mental objects or functions and identifies them with real ob-
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jects or persons that enables to sense and experience his/her own mental states as 
a part of the external world. For example, various bizarre objects or events, such 
as “listening chair”, “sight” of unanimous objects, and others, based on projective 
mechanism in which a splitted [unconscious] seeing or other sensations may be 
transferred to other persons or things (Bion, 1957). 
In this context, splitting has been also described as a disturbance or disconnec-
tion between two (or more) mental states or thoughts preventing conscious 
awareness against unbearable negative emotions. A consequence of these “attacks 
on the link” is an inability to bring together two disconnected thoughts and form a 
new mental object and related emotional experience (Bion, 1957, 1959). 
1.1.3.  Lack of differentiation between inner and outer
A limited capacity to differentiate between inner and outer world, and between 
subject and object is also closely linked to schizophrenic splitting. In this context, 
several studies compared splitting in schizophrenia with splitting in patients with 
borderline personality disorder (BPD) (Lustman, 1977; Blatt and Auerbach, 2001). 
The schizophrenic splitting in comparison to BPD has more “molecular” form of 
fragmentation (fractured actions, affects, raw drives, perceptions, memories and 
fantasy elaborations) as well as it lacks reality testing of subjective identification. 
On the contrary, the borderline splitting typically contains configurations of oppo-
site representational aggregates that occurs in successive alternations and pre-
serves reality testing and distinction between subjective and objective forms of 
self-awareness (Lustman, 1977; Freedman, 1980; Lerner and Lerner, 1982; Trimboli 
and Farr, 2000; Blatt and Auerbach, 2001). 
The differentiation deficit likely may be linked to Freud´s concept of libido 
withdrawal from external reality (Freud, 1911) and mental representations of ob-
jects (decathexis) (Freud, 1915b). On the other hand schizophrenic fragmentation 
and loss of differentiation between internal and external world can have a com-
mon origin in effects of the very early traumatic factors that do not allow differen-
tiation of primarily undifferentiated self-object representation through interrelated 
processes of exteroception and interoception as described by Kernberg (1982). 
Similarly, Grotstein (1977a; 1977b; 1990) described projective and introjective pro-
cesses related to experiences of missing objects and emphasized a basic deficit in 
the development of proprioreceptive functions and perceptual awareness which 
disables narcistic representations of objects (internal objects) that cannot be used 
for projective identification and re-introjection, which may lead to confusion be-
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tween internal and external reality.  Caparros (1999) called this process as “un-
completed narcissistic splitting”, which is characterized by a lack of borders be-
tween inner and outer world in which there is no separation, and any attachment 
is not possible. The core of this splitting is a denial of a primitive object (Burnham, 
1969) as a need-fear dilemma, consisting in an extreme need for external structure of 
the object simultaneously with a fear of abandonment or destruction. Similarly 
description of schizophrenic mind suggested also Benedetti (Peciccia and Benedet-
ti, 1996), who found that the basis of schizophrenic splitting is a blocked dynamic 
communication between ’disintegrated separate self’ (in which autistic separation 
predominates) and ’disintegrated symbiotic self’ (in which the nuclei of symbiotic 
fusion predominate). In a case of separateness between these states, the symbol of 
self cannot be created (Benedetti and Peciccia, 1998; Pestalozzi, 2003).
In this context Stern (1985) in his developmental theory described four basic 
self structures: 1. self-agency: sense of authorship of one’s own actions with self-
invariants of volition, proprioreceptive feedback, and predictability of conse-
quences; 2. self-coherence: sense of being non-fragmented, and as a physical 
whole; 3. self-affectivity: inner qualities of feelings patterned by experience; 4. self-
history: sense of continuity in time. The agencies are formed in the first months of 
life in mutual interactions between a child and a caregiver, which in the case of a 
disability to form ‘sense of a core self’ is linked to inability to appropriately differen-
tiate and distinguish between self and non-self as an agent of an internal experi-
ence (Stern, 1985).
Also other authors were focused on the process leading to a loss of differentia-
tion and distinctions that causes undifferentiated state. For example, Robbins 
(1993, 2011) described the undifferentiated state of mind as a form of undifferenti-
ated experience of the world - ’protosymbiosis’. According to Bleger (1974) this 
‘symbiotic’ state disables to process projective identification as an ability to con-
nect past mental experience with perceptual representations of actually experi-
enced events. In this context, the ‘schizophrenic autism’ likely presents ‘precon-
scious’ undifferentiated ‘symbiotic’ formation. In this undifferentiated state ‘ag-
glutinated nuclei’ [Latin agglutinare- “to glue“] are split-off and deposited in an 
external object with symbiotic link between self and external object (Sas, 1992). 
Bleger also considered this mental state as an independent earlier position 
preceding developmental stages experienced as paranoid schizoid position and 
described them as deficient and undeveloped mental states [glyschro-caryc posi-
tion, from Greek γλίσχροσ- sticky and καρυο- nucleus]: “schizophrenia results from 
a pathological splitting with inability to build up the schizoid content of the para-
noid-schizoid position” (Bleger, 1974, p. 24). 
Similar concept of primordial “undifferentiated state” can be found in Og-
den’s theory (1989), who called it as ‘autistic contiguous position’. Experiential mo-
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dalities characterizing the undifferentiated state are body touches on the skin sur-
face, rhythmicity and regularity of sucking (Ogden, 1989). Typical experiences 
characterizing the undifferentiated state were also described by Tustin (1988), who 
defined them as autistic shapes (e.g. gentle touches) or autistic objects (that cause 
hard pressure against the infant’s skin). The cause of a deficient differentiation 
from mother-child symbiosis likely is linked to a negative attachment, connected 
with a fantasy of “…an area of skin common to both mother and infant” (Anzieu, 
1993, p.46). Through this area they can communicate, they have the same feelings 
and sensations and may mutually “…read the thoughts”. The self is fragmented 
into incoherent collection of pieces which create internal undifferentiated ’black 
holes’ of separateness in which actual representations of otherness are missing 
(Anzieu, 1974; 1993). 
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1.2. NEUROSCIENCE OF SPLITTING IN SCHIZOPHRENIA AND 
NEUROPSYCHONALYTIC VIEWPOINT
According to recent evidence, mental disintegration in schizophrenia is related to 
disturbed binding and integration of multiple and disparate neural activities un-
derlying cognitive brain functions and consciousness (Singer, 1993, 2001; Varela et 
al., 2001; Fries, 2005; Tononi and Edelman, 2000; Peled, 1999; Lee et al., 2003; Ford 
et al., 2007). These findings indicate basic experimental paradigm for understand-
ing of conscious integration, which implicates understanding of schizophrenia as 
a disorder of neural integration (Tononi and Edelman, 2000). The concept of brain 
and cognitive disintegration in schizophrenia is reminiscent of the concept of 
“schizophrenia” proposed by Bleuler in his “Dementia Praecox, or the group of 
the schizophrenias” emphasizing the splitting or disintegration of consciousness 
(Bleuler, 1911/1950, 1919/1906, 1924).
In this recent and historical context the “interfield postulate” would implicate 
that the process of mental splitting likely might be related to some form of “neural 
splitting” in coordinated brain activity and information processing. Particular 
consequence of the splitting is also disturbed process of self-reference based on an 
ability to distinguish between the self and an external world which according to 
the interfield principle also is related to specific disturbances and disunity of the 
brain information processing. Within this context, various neuroscientific data and 
theories seem to provide a basic support for certain neuropsychoanalytic view-
points of splitting as a specific process on neural levels of information processing. 
Current findings indicate that psychological splitting in schizophrenia is likely 
specifically presented on a neural level as disrupted organization in neural com-
munication underlying deficits in mental processing described by three basic 
neuroscientific concepts of schizophrenia, i.e. theory of disturbed connectivity, 
theory of corollary discharges and dynamic theory of neural complexity. 
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1.2.1. Disturbed connectivity and splitting in schizophrenia
The relationship between mental disintegration and disturbed functional integra-
tion of the brain has been significantly developed in the theory of disconnection 
(Friston, 1996) or dysconnectivity (Stephan et al., 2009) of neural activities across 
different brain regions which likely may significantly influence perceptual, emo-
tional and cognitive processes (Park and Thakkar, 2010). In this context, discon-
nection means a deficit of functional integration among functionally specialized 
systems of various neural populations represented in different cortical areas 
(Friston, 1996; Park and Thakkar, 2010). The problem of functional integration of 
functionally specialized subsystems was also developed by Hoffman and 
McGlashan (1993), who proposed the parallel distributed processing (PDP) model 
of schizophrenia. The PDP model is based on experimental data and analysis of 
psychotic states induced by phencyclidine, or as a consequence of syndrome of 
metachromatic leukodystrophy and also neurometabolic studies suggesting that 
schizophrenia reflects a breakdown in communication between cortical areas. Us-
ing a computer simulation of the brain pathology they found that main neurocog-
nitive consequences present functionally autonomous cortical circuits called “par-
asitic foci” representing disconnected states that create delusions of control, para-
noid delusions “idee fixe” related to thought disturbances, hallucination, and cog-
nitive deficits (Hoffman and McGlashan, 1993). These parasitic areas in memory, 
excluded from other parts of conscious and pre-conscious mental processing, dis-
turb integrative functions and may lead to information interference and conflict 
(Piagnol et al., 2003). 
The neural disconnections may also be linked to various dysplastic changes 
and related to abnormal modulation of plasticity through dopamine and acetyl-
choline neurotransmitter systems (Friston, 2002). The disconnection processes also 
significantly influence regionally specialized neural activities responsible for emo-
tional learning and memory such as prefrontal and temporal cortex, mainly medi-
ated by NMDA glutamate transmissions (Friston, 1996, 1998; Stephan et al., 2006, 
2009). 
The concept of disturbed connectivity in schizophrenia has been also devel-
oped within the concept of multiple constraint organization proposed by Peled 
(1999; 2008), who emphasized a specific role of multiple connections that enable 
multimodal representations in the brain integrative processes through various 
connections among widespread brain units represented by neural assemblies. In 
this context, Andreasen et al. (1998) proposed that cognitive dysmetria in schizo-
phrenia is mainly based on disruptions of connectivity between several brain are-
as such as prefrontal regions, thalamic nuclei, and the cerebellum. In addition, 
large-scale simulations focused on dynamics of thalamo-cortical integrations sug-
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gest that an altered dynamics of cortico-thalamic and cortico-cortical re-entrant 
circuits may be influenced by disruptions of the local connectivity within single 
cortical areas (Tononi and Edelman, 2000). Similarly, Friston (1998) also supposed 
that these local disconnections might be a consequence of a failure of the brain 
binding mechanisms that reflect processes of ‘disconnection’ or on the other hand 
splitting in the mind. In addition, several data suggest that the connectivity may 
be decreased in some ‘symptomatic’ subtypes of schizophrenia and increased in 
other subtypes (Lee et al., 2003).
Following these findings current neuroimaging studies indicate that the idea 
of “split mind” becomes relevant in an updated context, and these studies address 
the mechanism by which splitting of the mind potentially occurs (Park and 
Thakkar, 2010). Together these studies are mainly based on reflecting disturbed 
connectivity or dysconnectivity (i.e. increased or decreased connectivity) between 
several parts of the brain during information processing related to specific psy-
chotic experiences or various experimental tasks (Park and Thakkar, 2010). For ex-
ample, Satterthwaite et al. (2010) reported that recognition memory of faces is im-
paired in patients with schizophrenia and used an affective face recognition para-
digm to examine possible interactions between cognitive and affective neural sys-
tems, namely cortical regions and amygdala, in schizophrenia using a functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during tasks with affective face recognition. 
They found that patients performed the task more slowly than healthy control 
participants. In comparison to control participants schizophrenic patients exhibit-
ed weakening of an interaction and correlation between activity in the amygdala 
and cortical regions involved in cognition, while the controls showed a negative 
correlation between these regions. This finding may have a relevance to psychical 
splitting between affect and cognition in schizophrenia as described by Bleuler 
(1911) and Ciompi (1982). 
Other interesting example is a study reported by Diederen et al. (2010), who 
examined fMRI activation in a network of language-related regions during audi-
tory verbal hallucinations and related signal changes preceding auditory halluci-
nations. During auditory verbal hallucinations they found heightened brain acti-
vation in bilateral (right more than left) language-related regions and bilateral mo-
tor regions. They also found prominent deactivation preceding these hallucina-
tions in the left parahippocampal gyrus and significant deactivation preceding 
hallucinations has been also found in the left superior temporal, right inferior 
frontal, left middle frontal gyri, in the right insula and the left cerebellum. The au-
thors concluded that a prominent finding of this study shows that the auditory 
verbal hallucinations were consistently preceded by deactivation of the 
parahippocampal gyrus that play a central role in memory recollection and send-
ing information from the hippocampus to the association areas. Dysfunctions in 
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this region caused by disinhibition of the parahippocampal gyrus via dopaminer-
gic innervations, trigger inadequate activity in language-related networks and au-
ditory verbal hallucinations may result from re-experiencing old memories 
(Diederen et al., 2010). 
In this context, it is possible to assume that hallucinations are essentially intru-
sions of unexpected or unintended information from long-term memory due to 
unstructured sensory input (Park and Thakkar, 2010). In agreement with recent 
cognitive models of schizophrenia these data suggest that contextual information 
exists within a frame of reference which influences access to conscious experience 
and within this context the positive symptoms of schizophrenia is possible to un-
derstand as “contextual disturbances” (Gray et al., 1991; Hemsley, 2005; Bion,
1957; 1959) that on neural level might be represented by deficits of information 
transfer within the brain and neural communication on synaptic levels.
1.2.2. Dysbalance of neural complexity and splitting in schizophrenia
According to current evidence neural basis of consciousness as an integrative ex-
perience likely represents synchronized neural processes that connect distributed 
brain activities related to various mental events into a coherent whole which is 
significantly disturbed in schizophrenia (Tononi and Edelman, 2000; Peled, 1999; 
Lee et al., 2003). Through these coherent links regulatory functions enable inhibi-
tion or enhancement of neural excitability to create representational maps that 
form a basis for integrative mental processing. This dynamic functional organiza-
tion likely also enables to create simultaneously active groups of neurons involved 
in dynamic alterations of communicating neuronal assemblies which may be 
competitive or may generate synchrony and coherent networks. In this context, 
this ability to come into synchrony (in gamma band or other frequency bands) de-
fines neural integration of the network or its complexity represented by simulta-
neously active groups of neurons (Tononi and Edelman, 2000; Lee et al., 2003).
Critical role in these integrative processes likely play cortical inhibitory sys-
tems that enable modulation of neural plasticity which is manifested by a func-
tional reorganization of synaptic connections (Daskalakis et al., 2007). At the same 
time the inhibitory systems enable orchestrated activation of a parallel set of in-
hibitory interneurons that organize cortical processes to an intended action and 
prevent aberrant activation (Jones, 1993). Nevertheless, although disturbances of 
these regulatory functions are influenced by inhibitory deficits, also normal inhibi-
tory functions may fail because of enhancement of certain signals related to in-
creased neural excitability. In this context, the regulatory functions are vulnerable 
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to both inhibitory failure and signal enhancement which suggest that disruptions 
of temporal binding in distributed neural networks may be influenced by multiple 
mechanisms. Basic role in this regulatory functions likely play various 
neuromodulatory processes that likely have a profound influence on the cerebral 
functions through their effects on the neural excitability and synaptic functions 
that are significantly disturbed in schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders 
(Gordon and Hen, 2004; Gray and Roth, 2007; Kruglikov and Rudy, 2008).
According to recent evidence, the process of disturbed neural integration lead-
ing to increased or decreased functional segregation among groups of neurons 
might also be quantified using concepts from statistical information theory and in 
particular by defining a measure of neural complexity that could provide a possi-
ble explanation for a failure of stability and self-regulatory processes related to 
disorganized cognition in schizophrenia (Bob, 2008; Breakspear, 2006; Sporns et 
al., 2000; Sporns et al., 2002; Bob et al., 2009; Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008; Tononi, 
2004; Tononi and Koch, 2008). An increase in complexity is often associated with 
symmetry breaking and the ability of a system to have different states, which is al-
so associated with a decrease in coherence in space over the long range (Weng et 
al., 1999). 
The mathematical and physical concept of neural complexity (Tononi et al., 
1994) is characterized by dynamic changes between integration, related to func-
tional connectivity, and segregation, linked to functional specialization of distinct 
neural subsystems. In this context, neural complexity, measured by EEG and other 
psychophysiological measures, reflects processes during activity of independent 
areas that enable fast parallel information processing that runs in a distributed 
mode (Klonowski et al., 1999; Sammer, 1996; Elbert et al., 1992; Svetlak et al., 2010; 
Bob et al., 2009; Bob and Svetlak, 2011). This means that numerous processes from 
sensory and cognitive channels are executed simultaneously and this desynchro-
nized neural state may be related to active information processing in the cortex 
(Tirsch et al., 2004).
Together these findings suggest that the process of neural or cognitive uncou-
pling may influence more irregular neural states with higher complexity and neg-
atively affect connectivity patterns and integrative phenomena in the brain that 
are closely linked to an integrated conscious experience.
In this context, application of nonlinear methods of complexity analysis ap-
plied to EEG and behavioral data obtained from schizophrenia patients have 
shown abnormal patterns of complexity and irregularity (Breakspear, 2006) and 
altered sequential architecture of their choice-task behavior as a coexistence of 
highly predictable and highly unpredictable sequences (Paulus and Braff, 2003). 
Similarly, nonlinear and statistical analysis of data from measurement of 
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electrodermal activity (EDA) also indicated heightened neural complexity in 
schizophrenic patients (Bob et al., 2009). 
In this context, psychological splitting and brain disunity is possible to study 
on levels of mental disintegration reflected by psychotic symptoms in schizophre-
nia that may be related to decreased or increased synchrony. For example rela-
tionship between wavelet coherence in some pairs of EEG signal and psychotic 
symptoms (Bob et al., 2008) or similar relationship between dissociative symptoms 
in schizophrenia and cross-correlations between EEG pairs likely as a consequence 
of pathological influences of traumatic ‘splitting’ or ‘dissociation’ in schizophrenia  
(Bob et al., 2010). 
1.2.3. Splitting, lack of differentiation and corollary discharges
Cognitive and affective representations of one’s identity or the subject of experi-
ence present a basis for self-recognition as a specific cognitive process typically 
involving conscious experience and interpretation of own activity as was previ-
ously mentioned in various psychoanalytical concepts (Capparos, 1999; Bleger, 
1974; Ogden, 1989) and child observational studies (Stern, 1985). Disruptions of 
these self-interpretation processes likely represent a neurophysiological substrate 
for the process of fragmentation of consciousness because of misattribution of cer-
tain inner states that may be interpreted as external objects because they are “dis-
owned” and dissociated from consciousness (Bob, 2008). In this context, a specific 
form of mental disintegration in schizophrenia linked to loss of differentiation of 
the internal and external world is likely related to deficits in communication be-
tween the frontal and temporal lobes (Ford et al., 2005). According to recent evi-
dence, this disintegration of consciousness probably produces defective self-
monitoring and self-experiencing (Feinberg, 1978; Ford et al., 2001, 2007) and this 
lack of interaction and disintegration may reflect the process of functional segre-
gation of sets of neurons localized in different cortical areas. 
According to recent findings this loss of distinctions between internally gener-
ated psychic activity and external input might be a neural substrate for hallucina-
tions leading to defective self-monitoring and self-integrity originating in motor 
brain structures (Feinberg, 1978; Feinberg and Guazzelli, 1999). The motor com-
mands from the brain structures are associated with neural discharges that alter 
activity in both sensory and motor pathways. These neural discharges called cor-
ollary discharges (or efference copy) have unique integrative functions that enable 
monitoring and modification of the commands themselves before an effector 
event is processed. In addition, they enable to inform sensory systems that the 
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stimulation produced by movement is self-generated or produced by an environ-
ment, which is crucial for the distinction between self and non-self (Feinberg, 
1978; Ford et al., 2001; Ford et al., 2005; Ford et al., 2007; Poulet and Hedwig, 
2007). In addition, this loss of distinctions may cause autonoetic agnosia as an ina-
bility to discriminate a self-generated mental activity from an externally generated 
one (Keefe et al., 2002). For example, patients with Schneiderian first rank symp-
toms of schizophrenia characterized by a loss of ego boundaries showed an aber-
rant relationships between a degree of discrepancy between seen (a virtual hand) 
and self-executed movements and brain activity as measured by regional cerebral 
blood flow by PET in the right angular gyrus and in the insular cortex (Farrer et 
al., 2004).  
Other experimental evidence for the relationship between conscious disinte-
gration and defective self-monitoring or self-experiencing has been reported in 
several studies during hallucinations (Feinberg, 1978; Ford et al., 2001, 2007; 
Poulet and Hedwig, 2007). For example, using the PET scan it has been found that 
applications of the same task to people with schizophrenia, and comparing 
hallucinators to nonhallucinators, show that the hallucinators have decreased 
blood flow in the speech monitoring areas, such as the left middle temporal gyrus 
and supplementary motor area (Andreasen, 1997).
In addition, there is also evidence that derangements of corollary discharges 
included in motor mechanisms of thinking produce many symptoms of schizo-
phrenia in the visual or auditory system (Ford et al. 2001, 2007). For example, self-
generated eye movements are related to a corollary discharge of the motor plan, 
informing the visual cortex that the changing of a visual input results from a self-
generated action. A similar mechanism likely exists also in the auditory system, 
where corollary discharges from motor speech commands prepare the auditory 
cortex for self-generated speech, likely through a link between frontal lobes, 
where speech is generated, and temporal lobes, where it is heard, for example, in-
ner speech is misidentified as external voices (Ford et al., 2007; Poulet and Hed-
wig, 2007).
In summary, recent findings on corollary discharges show that process of dis-
integration in schizophrenia is related to defective communication between struc-
tures of the frontal, temporal and occipital lobes which produces patterns of tem-
poral disorganization and decreased functional connectivity. In addition, efference 
copy deficits in schizophrenia basically present lack of information processing that 
is related to specific decrease in brain connectivity that may reflect a level of inde-
pendence between parts of the brain (Ford et al., 2008). 
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1.3. CONCLUSION
Current findings suggest that the psychoanalytical concept of splitting may pre-
sent an essence that may be found in various current neuroscientific theories of 
schizophrenia focused on processes of dysconnection in information processing. 
Although this relationship between the neural and mental processes of splitting is 
evident, there is an epistemological limitation in understanding these processes. 
This limitation is necessary, because although there is evidence that mental phe-
nomena are related to various physical, molecular, and neurophysiological pro-
cesses, it is not simply possible to suppose that all brain information processes 
have mental representation strictly defined in time and space. Nevertheless it is 
evident and without doubt that large (indefinable) parts of the brain’s information 
content and related neural and information processes are linked to the conscious 
and unconscious mind. 
In addition, including the time dimension as a sequence of mental phenomena 
that produce states of consciousness enables the mind to be defined as a specific 
set of mental states represented by various states of consciousness and their con-
nections, which provide associative chains. In this context, it is possible to connect 
physical and molecular processing linked to neural microstates with the level of 
information processes in the mind (Bob, 2011). Although the brain–mind interfield 
principle and dual aspect monism present basic epistemological principles, at the 
same time they suggest experimentally testable consequences for 
neuropsychoanalysis and other brain–mind sciences. Using those principles it is 
possible to connect psychophysiological and psychometric methods and experi-
mentally assess various neurophysiological, molecular and physical processes as 
well as processes in the psychological domain with the purpose to study relation-
ships between them.
As a consequence, application of the brain–mind interfield principle and dual 
aspect monism, although it is limited, may help to integrate various findings be-
tween the both fields in a meaningful way and using this principle in 
neuropsychoanalysis may be useful in making specific, experimentally testable 
predictions and defining methods for their performance. In this context, Freud 
(1895) in agreement with general thermodynamic and neuropsychological princi-
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ples proposed that mind and brain transform the free energy into mental and be-
havioral activities and focus it on a target in the process of projection or transfer-
ence which enables that the free psychic energy is ”bound”. Based on this princi-
ple mind and brain tend to prefer dynamic activity patterns related to feelings of 
balance with lowest possible level of free energy. Freud suggested that mental in-
tegration as a potentiality of the “balanced” state of the mind without a conflict 
might be linked to “neural unity”. On the other hand, within the framework of the 
dual aspect monism it is possible to suppose that splitting of the mind is related to 
a form of neural disunity and both processes could be consequences of processes 
of information disintegration that manifest in the brain as well as in the mind. 
In this context, interfield theory presents theoretical postulate suggesting that 
connections between the field of mind and brain may be build on scientific and 
experimentally testable principles. These principles most likely are linked to iso-
morphism based on mutually corresponding levels of order or disorder in the 
brain as well as in the mind that enables measurable distinguishing between or-
dered or disordered states of the mind and the body.   
In the brain ordered states are based on coordinated brain activities related to 
information processing based on series of timely and spatially organized mi-
crostates (i.e. neural binding) that provide a unique ability to combine neural bits 
of information into complex patterns of activities which manifest as mental func-
tions and behavior. This ability of the brain self-organization to coordinate neural 
microstates and “bind” them into complex patterns of information enables to use 
and extrapolate basic terms used in thermodynamics and information theory into 
specific brain information processing. 
This relationship between thermodynamics and information theory is based 
on physical principles that enable to connect Shannon’s concept of information en-
tropy with Boltzmann’s statistical formulation of the entropy which indicate that 
the loss of information increases spatial disorder (Scott, 2005; Volkenstein, 2009). 
This relationship is based on the works published by Szilard (1929/1964), Roth-
stein (1951) and Brillouin (1956), who found an interesting connection between the 
Boltzmann entropy and Shannon information entropy (Frieden, 2004). The semi-
nal article “On the Decrease of Entropy in a Thermodynamic System by the Inter-
vention of Intelligent Beings” connecting statistical Boltzmann entropy with in-
formation theory was published by Szilard in 1929 who formulated physical con-
nection between thermodynamic entropy and information (Szilard, 1929/1964; 
Zurek, 1984). Similarly, Brillouin (1956) found that information connected with 
certain specific physical system, which is bound in the system, is related to its en-
tropy, i.e. bound information = decrease in entropy = increase in negentropy [i.e 
negative entropy] and on the other hand information loss = increase in entropy = 
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decrease in negentropy, which means that increase of entropy and loss of infor-
mation proceed together (Brillouin, 1956).
Based on this relationship, it is possible to connect time and spatial coordina-
tion of neural microstates with information patterns in the brain and formulate the 
Brain-Mind information principle (Bob, 2011). This connection specifically means 
that disturbed neural coordination of neural microstates implicates increase in sta-
tistical disorder on a neural level related to various physical and molecular pro-
cesses that consequently [on higher level of disarrangement] may appear as func-
tional or structural deficits of the brain. There is evidence that mental phenomena 
are related to various physical, molecular and neurophysiological processes and it 
is evident that a part of the brain information content is linked to the human con-
sciousness. In this context, it is possible to connect physical and molecular pro-
cessing connected to neural microstates with the level of information processes in 
the human mind. Based on this relationship, it is possible to define brain entropy 
as a level of disorder reflecting deficits of time and spatial coordination of neural 
microstates which consequently defines “entropy” of mind as a specific level of 
disorder that is subjectively experienced and reflected in human mind behavior.  
This physical-information relationship enables to define a basic principle of 
brain-mind information exchange that is based on the relationship between brain 
physical processes and information processing in the human mind. The relation-
ship between statistical (material) entropy in the brain and information entropy 
related to information content in the human mind therefore presents and consti-
tutes the basic brain-mind information principle, which specifically states that the 
loss of information during brain information processing implicates increased dis-
order (and entropy) of the brain and mind (Bob, 2011).
In this context, interfield view presents philosophical postulate that may be 
scientifically described using thermodynamics and information theory that repre-
sents basis for the relationship between psychological and neuroscience descrip-
tions that also enable to explain mutual influences between mental and neural 
level of schizophrenia. 
Typical example of application of the brain-mind information principle is pos-
sible to apply in research of schizophrenic patients. The brain-mind information 
principle states that the loss of information during brain information processing 
implicates increased disorder (and entropy) of the brain and mind. In the context 
of schizophrenia, the brain-mind information principle predicts that the loss of in-
formation typically implicates disorder and increased statistical randomness in the 
microscopic spatial domain of the brain. On the other hand the loss of information 
also predicts increased randomness in the temporal domain of mind, as for exam-
ple pseudo-randomness in association flow of schizophrenic patients and other 
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temporal discontinuities of mental experience such as amnesia, depersonalization 
or derealization and other symptoms. 
This consequence of brain-mind information principle is in agreement with 
findings documenting the disorder in the brain spatial domain of schizophrenic 
patients and there is evidence that spatio-temporal binding and synchronization 
mainly in gamma range related to brain information processing is significantly af-
fected in schizophrenia (Tononi and Edelman, 2000; Peled, 1999; Lee et al., 2003; 
Ford et al., 2008; Uhlhaas et al., 2008; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010).
On the other hand disturbed order related to information loss in the temporal 
domain is documented in studies of associative process and other studies focused 
on discontinuities in schizophrenic thinking and its pseudorandom behavior ob-
served in word associations (Jung, 1909; Kent and Rosonoff, 1910; Moran et al., 
1964; Shakow, 1980; Goldberg and Weinberger, 2000), impaired verbal fluency 
(Allen et al., 1993; Himelhoch et al., 1996; Vinogradov et al., 2002) and textual 
analyses of the semantic processing (Manschreck et al., 1979, 1981; Hoffman et al., 
1982; Goldberg and Weinberger, 2000) indicating deficits in organization of se-
mantic memory in schizophrenia (Davis et al., 1995; Paulsen et al., 1996; 
Vinogradov et al., 2002). 
These findings are in agreement with long-term observational data in schizo-
phrenia which show that the psychological influences on patients’ mind likely 
may explain radical improvements (Harding, 2003; DeSisto et al., 1995; Harrison et 
al., 2001) and there is evidence that psychological therapies may significantly in-
fluence treatment outcome in schizophrenia (Mojtabaj et al., 1998; Gottdiener and 
Haslam, 2002; Sjostrom, 1985; Wunderlich et al., 1996) and on a parallel levels also 
brain functions (Andreasen, 1997; Bob, 2011). In recent time new psychotherapeu-
tic approaches have been developed enhancing binding and synthetic capacity of 
thinking and fostering differentiation abilities between inner and outer world, 
based on psychoanalytical principles. There should be mentioned particularly 
mentalization based psychodynamic psychotherapy (Bateman and Fonagy, 2006; 
Brent, 2009) or approaches focused on intersubjective experience and metacogni-
tive capacity (Lysaker et al., 2012a). 
However, evaluation of the effect of psychoanalytically based therapies is 
complicated by the fact that the effect is likely to rise during follow-up after com-
pletion of treatment and the benefits of the therapeutic relationship can be ex-
pected no sooner than in five years of therapy (Mojtabaj et al., 1998; Robbins, 
1993). Assuming validated hypothesis of dual aspect monism of splitting and de-
differentiation in schizophrenia we might have a chance to observe the effect of 
treatment using neurophysiological measurements earlier than by usual clinical 
assessments and also previously estimate which patients benefit more from the 
treatment.
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In addition, the brain-mind information principle predicts process of splitting 
as a consequence of the information loss, related to inability to integrate some 
mental contents into consciousness that determines disorder in the temporal in-
formation domain of mind. Those typical events of the information loss it is also 
possible to observe in various experimental and clinical situations such as in hyp-
nosis, during stressful tasks leading to conflict or information overload and in var-
ious clinical cases. In this context, some presentations of dissociation in its severe 
forms such as dissociative identity disorder or in some cases of hypnosis could 
present logical consequence of basic principles of nature that predict disorder and 
pseudorandomness in information integration within the temporal domain of 
mind as a consequence of specific psychological and neurobiological changes 
leading to information loss in brain information processing.  Similarly, the infor-
mation loss in schizophrenia most likely might be related to mental fragmentation 
and connected with primitive defense mechanisms, loss of differentiation between 
inner and outer world and loss of ability to symbolize. In this context, the word 
“information” (from Latin informare) means to form or to shape and create spatial 
and temporal relations. 
Critical epistemological aspect of the brain-mind information principle (Bob, 
2011) is that it enables to integrate various finding in the field in a meaningful 
way, it is compatible with substantial findings in the field and using this principle 
may help to establish a novel brain-mind information theory which can be useful 
to make specific experimentally testable predictions and define methods for their 
performance.
Application of the brain-mind information principle in psychology, cognitive 
neurosciences and psychoanalysis is capable to provide specific experimental pre-
dictions representing regular implications of the theory. In addition, application of 
the concept could in principle enable to integrate experimental psychology and 
neuropsychoanalysis into the domain of interdisciplinary physical sciences based 
on rigorous applications of the mathematical theory and experimental data acqui-
sition that provides promising perspective to utilize theoretical and experimental 
principles of physical sciences in the field of neuroscientific, psychological and 
psychoanalytical research and connect both parts of the “Cartesian” universe us-
ing scientific methods as originally proposed Freud (1875) in his “Project for Sci-
entific Psychology”.  
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2. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
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2.1. SPLITTING IN SCHIZOPHRENIA AND BORDERLINE 
PERSONALITY DISORDER
2.1.1. Introduction
Splitting reflects shifts of mind related to a consciously experienced conflict of op-
posing mental forces. In principle it describes fragmentation of conscious experi-
ence that is typically related to long-term or acute stress that significantly disturbs 
selfconcept, identity, memory and perception of the external world (Breuer & 
Freud, 1895; Kohut, 1971; Stone, 1988; Bob, 2008; Ellenberger, 1970). Nevertheless, 
empirical studies of psychopathological processes related to splitting are very ra-
re.  
In schizophrenia the term splitting was developed by Bleuler (1911), who de-
scribed process of mental fragmentation in schizophrenia as associative splitting 
or “loosening of associations” and considered it as a basic factor in pathogenesis 
of the disease. Later concept of splitting was described by Kernberg (1975), who 
used the process of splitting as a specific characteristic of cognitive and affective 
disturbances in borderline personality disorder (BPD) which typically manifest as 
shifts of emotional perception of objects, other persons and the self with typical 
fluctuations between idealization and devaluation. 
These alterations on mental level consequently may be linked to great and ab-
rupt changes in patterns of neural activity that may dissociate, or split off, certain 
external and internal stimuli and information out of awareness, which may lead to 
distinct states of divided consciousness (Hilgard, 1986; Crawford, 1994; Rainville 
et al., 2002; Vermetten and Douglas, 2004; Bob, 2008) and disorganization of se-
mantic memory (Goldberg et al. 1998, Paulsen et al. 1996, Robert et al. 1998).
With respect to recent findings and theoretical concept a purpose of this study 
is to examine relationships between psychological process of splitting and dis-
turbed cognitive and affective functions in schizophrenia and BPD.  




The participants were recruited from regular daily treatment programs for schiz-
ophrenic and BPD patients at the Psychotherapeutic and Psychosomatic Clinic 
ESET in Prague. All participants signed informed consent and the study was ap-
proved by Charles University ethical committee. In the study were included only 
patients who had not compromised capacity and ability to consent. This ability 
was confirmed by clinical data about the patients and specific written statement 
regarding each participant by his/her psychiatrist. Each included participant was 
able to consider his/her participation and no one was included in the study based 
on agreement of legally authorized representative consented on the behalf of a 
participant. 
The participants had diagnosis of schizophrenia or borderline personality disor-
der. Exclusion criteria were organic illnesses involving the central nervous system, 
substance, and/or alcohol abuse and mental retardation (IQ Raven lower than 90) 
(Raven, 1960). Clinical diagnoses were reassessed using the Mini-International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.) (Sheehan et al., 1998) in schizophrenia pa-
tients and in BPD patients it was confirmed using semistructured interview for 
borderline personality disorder based on DSM-IV criteria. The sample included 30 
patients with schizophrenia, i.e. 15 men and 15 women, mean age 35.7 (SD =9.2) 
with mean period of psychiatric treatment 12.89 (SD = 7.8) years and with average 
of 4.1 hospitalizations. The sample of BPD patients included 35 participants, i.e. 10 
men and 25 women, mean age 32.0 (SD = 7.9) years with mean period of psychiat-
ric treatment 6.2 (SD = 3.97) years and with average of 2.28 hospitalizations. 
Psychometric measures
With respect to current theoretical concepts and empirical data we have tested re-
lationship between splitting based on Splitting Index score (Gould et al., 1996) and 
verbal fluency as an indicator for semantic memory disorganization (Goldberg et 
al., 1998; Paulsen et al., 1996; Franceschi P., 2013) in patients with schizophrenia 
and BPD. To test how the splitting process is typically represented in schizophre-
nia and BPD we have compared occurrence of these psychopathological manifes-
tations in schizophrenia and BPD and their relationships to other symptoms.
The symptoms of splitting were measured using self-reported Splitting Index 
(SI) (Gould et al., 1996) that enables to assess defense mechanisms related to split-
ting according to concept proposed by Kernberg (1976). Splitting Index is 24-items 
self-reported questionnaire assessed on 5-point Likert scale from 1 to 5 
(Cronbach’s alfa 0.92, test-retest reliability after one week 0.82). Using factor anal-
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ysis three clusters of items have been identified that enable to describe the split-
ting process. These three factors represent: 1. the self factor (splitting of the self 
image), 2. the family factor (splitting of images of family members), and 3. the fac-
tor of others which describes splitting with respect to people outside the family. 
Other psychopathological manifestations in both groups of patients were 
measured using Health of the Nation Outcome Scales (HoNOS) (Wing et al., 
1996). The scale includes 12 items including overactive, aggressive, disruptive or 
agitated behavior; nonaccidental self-injury; problem drinking or drug-taking; 
cognitive problems; physical illness or disability problems; hallucinations or delu-
sions; problems with depressed mood; other mental and behavioral problems; 
problems with relationships; problems with activities of daily living; problems 
with living conditions; problems with occupation and activities. This scale in-
cludes two versions, i.e. the version for external evaluators and the self-reported 
version (Cronbach’s alfa 0.79, test-retest reliability after one week 0.85) (Pec et al., 
2009).
As a measure of semantic memory disorganization, which is very close to 
Bleuler’s concept of mental fragmentation, we have used verbal fluency test 
(Preiss et al., 2002; Goldberg et al., 1998, Paulsen et al., 1996). In this context, recent 
findings show that verbal fluency is severely disturbed in schizophrenia (Henry 
and Crawford, 2005) and it is closely related to disorganized dimension of psy-
chopathology in schizophrenic patients (Robert et al., 1998). 
Data analysis
Statistical evaluation of the results of SI and other psychometric measures includ-
ed descriptive statistics, Mann-Whitney test for independent samples and Spear-
man correlation coefficients. The non-parametric analyses were preferred because 
SI data have not normal distribution. All the methods of statistical evaluation 
were performed using the software package Statistica version 6. To prevent Type 
II error which would disable to reject null hypothesis that the measure of splitting 
is not linked to verbal fluency and psychopathological symptoms we performed 
Power Analysis and assessed the effect sizes characterizing differences between 
means and correlation coefficients.
Results
Results show significant differences in scores of splitting, verbal fluency and psy-
chopathological symptoms measured by HoNOS between BPD and schizophrenia 
groups that were compared using Man-Whitney test (Table 1). Mean score of the 
Splitting Index (SI) was significantly higher in BPD group than in schizophrenia. 
On the other hand score of verbal fluency was significantly lower in schizo-
phrenia group. In both assessments of HoNOS, for external evaluators and for self 
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evaluation, the BPD group scored significantly higher in means of total scores. In 
the power analysis we have tested significant differences which show that all dif-
ferences between means have strong effect size (r =0.5 or higher; Table 1).
Results also show significant Spearman correlation coefficients characterizing 
relationships between splitting, verbal fluency and psychopathological symptoms 
measured by HoNOS in both samples (Table 2). Very significant relationship be-
tween verbal fluency and the SI ‘‘factor of others’’ in schizophrenia patients was 
found (Spearman r =-0.52, p, 0.01). Other significant correlations in schizophrenia 
patients were found between self-reported score of HoNOS(S) and total score of 
splitting (SI) (Spearman r = 0.42, p, 0.05) and between HoNOS(S) and SI(S) [repre-
senting splitting of the self] (Spearman r = 0.63, p, 0.01). On the other hand signifi-
cant correlations in borderline personality disorder were found between 
HoNOS(S) and SI(S) [representing splitting of the self] (Spearman r = 0.45, p, 0.01) 
and between HoNOS self-reported score and verbal fluency (Spearman r =0.37, p, 
0.01). 







SI 2.84 3.14 -2.2 0.0025 0.58
SI(S) 2.69 3.43 -2.8 0.0053 0.82
SI(F) 2.87 3.01 -1 0.3384 0.14
SI(O) 2.96 2.99 -0.2 0.8759 0.05
VF 34.5 41.43 -2.8 0.0052 0.79
HoNOS (E) 11.6 15 -2.6 0.0085 0.81
HoNOS (S) 7.8 14.25 -3.9 0.0000 0.97
Note: SI – Splitting Index, SI(S) – Splitting Index, factor of self, SI(F) –
Splitting Index, factor of  family,  SI(O) – Splitting Index, factor of others, 
VF- verbal fluency, HoNOS(E)- version for external evaluation of HoNOS 
(mean),  HoNOS(S) - self-rating version of HoNOS (mean),  r - standard-
ized effect size
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
35
Table 2. Spearman correlation coefficients between SI, verbal fluency, 
and HoNOS in schizophrenia and BPD.
SI SI(S) SI(F) SI(O) VF HoNOS(E)
Sch BPD Sch BPD Sch BPD Sch BPD Sch BPD Sch BPD
SI(S) 0.76 0.68 _ _
SI(F) 0,72 0,53 0,40 0,05 _ _
SI(O) 0.73 0.47 0.27 0.01 0,50 0,09 _ _
VF -0.31 0.15 0.02 0.19 -0,23 0,05 -0.52 -0.05 _ _
HoNOS(E) 0.26 0.13 0.28 0.33 0,21 0,14 0.09 -0.07 -0.22 0.15 _ _
HoNOS(S) 0.42 0.28 0.63 0.45 0,14 0,10 0.10 -0.10 0.16 0.37 0.48 0.70
Note: Values at p0.05 are in bold, Fisher Z higher than 0. 05, Sch – schizophrenia, BPD –
borderline personality disorder, SI – Splitting Index, SI(S) – Splitting Index, factor of self, 
SI(F) – Splitting Index, factor of  family,  SI(O) – Splitting Index, factor of others, VF-
verbal fluency,  HoNOS(E)¨- version for external evaluation of HoNOS, HoNOS(S) - self-
rating version of HoNOS.
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2.1.3. Discussion
Main results of this study indicate significant differences in splitting, verbal fluen-
cy and psychopathological symptoms between schizophrenia and BPD patients. 
These findings show significantly higher level of splitting measured by SI in BPD 
patients compared to schizophrenia. On the other hand schizophrenia patients 
show significantly lower scores of verbal fluency most likely as a consequence of 
cognitive disorganization which in principle is in agreement with Bleuler’s histor-
ical concept of splitting in schizophrenia (Bleuler, 1911). In this context, the corre-
lation between verbal fluency and splitting (factor of others) in schizophrenia 
suggests that stronger levels of splitting into opposite aspects related to external 
objects and persons is related to disassociation of memory patterns that is mani-
fested as disturbed verbal fluency.
Recent findings also show that impaired verbal fluency is associated with psy-
chomotor slowness (Sumioshi et al., 2005; van Bailen et al., 2004) that might be re-
lated to disconnection between brain regions (van Beilen et al., 2004). The discon-
nection between brain regions also disables integrated response to emotional 
stimuli, which might be linked to specific differences in amygdala activity and 
prefrontal functions in schizophrenia and BPD (Barnow et al., 2010). Schizophre-
nia is typically characterized by reduced activation in amygdala and prefrontal 
cortex and on the other hand increased and excessive activation in amygdala and 
prefrontal cortex has been found during emotional tasks in BPD (Barnow et al., 
2010; Williams et al., 2007; Reske et al., 2009; Schmahl et al., 2004; Scherpiet et al., 
2013). 
These typical neurophysiological changes might reflect typical differences related 
to splitting in schizophrenia and BPD based on psychological mechanisms of de-
fense against unacceptable affective impulses (Klein, 1946). Responses to these 
impulses in BPD likely reflect disturbed levels of reality testing in response to var-
ious perceptual stimuli that typically result to increased emotional activation and 
irritability (Lustman, 1977; Blatt and Auerbach, 2001; Stone, 1988), which on neu-
rophysiological level could be reflected in increased prefrontal and amygdala ac-
tivation (Barnow et al., 2010). On the other hand disturbed verbal fluency in 
schizophrenia patients is likely related to decreased activity in amygdala and pre-
frontal activity in schizophrenia (Barnow et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2007; Reske et 
al., 2009), which might reflect inability to appropriately differentiate and reflect 
emotional stimuli (Anzieu, 1993; Ogden, 1989) likely due to disruption in 
attentional selection and decision related activation (Bob and Mashour, 2011).
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In summary, the results show that the process of splitting has different forms in 
schizophrenia and BPD. In BPD patients splitting results to mental instability 
manifested as shifts in emotional perception of objects, other persons and the self, 
which are linked to increased mental tension and excessive prefrontal and amyg-
dala activation. This specific form of splitting that occur in BPD is not typically 
present in schizophrenic patients, which is in agreement with the results indicat-
ing that SI score as a measure of borderline splitting is higher in BPD than in 
schizophrenia patients. On the other hand in schizophrenia the mental fragmenta-
tion leads to splitting of associations observed as lower scores of verbal fluency 
which in principle is in agreement with Bleuler’s historical concept of splitting in 
schizophrenia (Bob and Mashour, 2011). This form of mental fragmentation in 
schizophrenia may represent a defense mechanism decreasing several psycho-
pathological manifestations due to lowered mental tension and abnormally inhib-
ited brain activities in amygdala and prefrontal cortices. Nevertheless it is also 
possible that mental fragmentation in schizophrenic patients is also related to def-
icits in contextual processing that may be primarily based on brain’s ability to in-
tegrate information (Bob and Mashour, 2011; Rotenberg and Weinberg, 1999). This 
brain deficit to integrate information may be linked to various etiological condi-
tions reflecting pathological processes on molecular, physiological and psycholog-
ical levels. This brain potentiality to integrate information is on cognitive level 
specifically linked to ability to create integrated self-concept and synthetic capabil-
ities related to various forms of metacognitive deficits that is typical impaired in 
schizophrenia (Mishara et al.,   2014; Lysaker et al., 2013a; Kukla et al., 2013; 
Lysaker et al., 2013b; Tas et al., 2012; Dimaggio et al., 2008).
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2.2. DISSOCIATION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA AND BORDERLINE 
PERSONALITY DISORDER
2.2.1. Introduction
Dissociation in principle describes fragmentation of conscious experience that is 
typically related to long-term or acute stress that significantly disturbs self-
concept, identity, memory, and perception of the external world (Breuer and 
Freud, 1895; Stone, 1988; Bob, 2008; Ellenberger, 1970). Consequently, these altera-
tions may be linked to marked and abrupt changes in patterns of neural activity 
that may dissociate, or split off, certain external and internal stimuli and infor-
mation out of awareness, which may lead to distinct states of divided conscious-
ness (Hilgard, 1986; Crawford, 1994; Rainville et al., 2002; Vermetten and Douglas, 
2004; Bob, 2008).
Dissociation also reflects shifts of mind related to a consciously experienced 
conflict of opposing mental forces. In the similar context as Janet, also Bleuler 
coined the term splitting and described the process of mental fragmentation in 
schizophrenia as a basic step in the pathogenesis of the disease (Bob, 2012; 
Hilgard, 1986; Bleuler, 1911). The term fragmentation of consciousness in the sense 
of splitting was also defined in borderline personality disorder (BPD) as aspecific 
form of dissociation, and recent studies suggest that the relationship between dis-
sociative symptoms and BPD per se is very close (Korzekwa et al., 2009a; Zanarini 
and Jager-Hyman, 2009; Zanarini et al., 2008).
With the aim of finding specific relationships between dissociative symptoms 
and other symptoms in BPD and schizophrenia, we assessed both groups of pa-
tients with the aim of comparing the occurrence of dissociation and also of as-
sessing the possible influence of antipsychotic medication using chlorpromazine 
equivalents (EC).




The participants were recruited from regular daily treatment programs for outpa-
tients with schizophrenia or BPD at the Psychotherapeutic and Psychosomatic 
Clinic ESET in Prague. The participants had a diagnosis of schizophrenia or BPD. 
Exclusion criteria were organic illnesses involving the central nervous system, 
substance and/or alcohol abuse, and mental retardation (Raven’s IQ, 90) (Raven, 
1960). Clinical diagnoses were based on DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition) criteria and were reassessed using The Mini-
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (Sheehan et al., 1998) in patients with 
schizophrenia and confirmed by semistructured interview in patients with BPD. 
We calculated actual daily doses of antipsychotic medication in EC for all partici-
pants (Woods, 2003).
The schizophrenia sample comprised 31 patients (15 men and 16 women) of 
mean age 36.2±9.5 years. Their mean duration of psychiatric treatment was 
13.3±8.2 years, and they had an average of 4.4 hospitalizations. The BPD sample 
comprised 36 patients (eleven men and 25 women) of mean age 31.0±8.7 years. 
Their mean duration of psychiatric treatment was 6.6±4.1 years, and they had an 
average of 2.39 hospitalizations. Because of their different durations of psychiatric 
treatment, the patients also had a different medication history and as measurable 
equivalent characterizing their current medication we have used EC. 
Psychometric measures
We used the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) to screen for dissociative symp-
toms (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986). The DES is a 28-item self-report questionnaire 
that evaluates the frequencies of various experiences of dissociative phenomena in 
the patient’s everyday life. Each item ranges from 0 to 100 and the mean of all 
item scores is calculated as the DES score. For more detailed assessment of the 
DES items, we analyzed the DES factors that have been used in previous research 
studies (Waller et al., 1996). In this analysis, we used three factors focused on ab-
sorption (items 2, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 20), amnesia related to dissociative states 
(items 3, 4, 5, 8, 25, and 26), and depersonalization/derealization (items 7, 11, 12, 
13, 27, and 28). In the present study, we used the Czech version of the DES; like 
the original English version, it shows high reliability and internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha 0.92, test–retest reliability after one week 0.91)(Bob, 2000; 
Ptacek et al., 2006). 
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Symptoms related stress and traumatic experiences were measured using the 
Trauma Symptom Checklist-40 (TSC-40) (Elliot and Briere, 1992). The scale was 
designed for measurement of posttraumatic symptomatology associated with 
childhood trauma. TSC-40 is a self-reported scale that contains 40 items with 6 
subscales, i.e., dissociation, anxiety, depression, a sexual abuse trauma index, sex-
ual problems, and sleep disturbances. The Czech version of the TSC-40 has high 
reliability and internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha 0.91, test-retest reliability af-
ter one week 0.88)(Bob et al., 2003).
Psychotic manifestations in both groups of patients was measured with Health 
of the Nation Outcome Scales (HoNOS) (Wing, Curtis, & Beevor, 1996). The scale 
includes 12 items (overactive, aggressive, disruptive or agitated behavior; non-
accidental self-injury; problem drinking or drug-taking; cognitive problems; phys-
ical illness or disability problems; problems with hallucinations or delusions; 
problems with depressed mood; other mental and behavioral problems; problems 
with relationships; problems with activities of daily living; problems with living 
conditions; problems with occupation and activities). There are two versions 
available: the version for external evaluators and the self-rating version for pa-
tients. The both versions were translated into the Czech language (Cronbach’s alfa 
0.797, test-retest reliability after one week 0.85) (Pec et al., 2009).
Statistical analysis
Statistical evaluation of the results for the DES and other psychometric measures 
included descriptive statistics, the Mann–Whitney U test for independent samples, 
and Spearman correlation coefficients. Nonparametric analyses were preferred 
because the DES data were not normally distributed. All the methods used for sta-
tistical evaluation were performed using Statistica version 6 software (StatSoft 
Inc., Tulsa, OK, USA). To prevent type II error, which would not be able to reject 
the null hypothesis that symptoms of dissociation are not linked to stress-related 
psychopathological symptoms, we performed a power analysis and assessed the 
effect sizes by characterizing differences between means or correlation coefficients 
of the samples.
2.2.3. Results
We compared scores from the psychometric measures using the Mann–Whitney U 
test to test for differences in dissociation, other psychopathological manifestations, 
and use of antipsychotic medication between the two disorders (see Table 1). Alt-
hough the differences in DES scores between patients with BPD and those with 
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schizophrenia were not statistically significant, scores for symptoms of traumatic 
stress measured by the TSC-40 were significantly higher in the BPD group.
External evaluations as well as self-rating on the HoNOS showed that the BPD 
group had significantly higher scores than patients with schizophrenia. Neverthe-
less, in several subscales of the HoNOS, external evaluators reported that the 
schizophrenia group had higher scores for cognitive problems (1.55 in schizo-
phrenia versus 0.66 in BPD, p=0.0001) and positive symptoms (1.26 in schizophre-
nia versus 0.54 in BPD, p=0.0273). Doses of antipsychotics measured by EC were 
significantly higher in the schizophrenia group. In the power analysis, we tested 
the differences between means, and found that all these had a strong effect size 
(r0.5; Table 3).
We calculated Spearman correlation coefficients in both patient samples to as-
sess the relationship between dissociation and other psychometric measures and 
the possible influence of antipsychotic medication on this relationship. The results 
show that scores on the DES, TSC-40, and HoNOS were significantly correlated 
(see Table 4). Interesting, statistically significant correlations were found in BPD 
patients between levels of EC and the DES score (Spearman’s correlation r=0.37; 
refined Fisher’s exact test Z=0.14) and between EC and depersonaliza-
tion/derealization score on the DES (Spearman’s correlation r=0.37; refined Fish-
er’s exact test Z=0.38).











DES 13.7 18.54 -1.8 0.0730 0.36
TSC-40 34.1 54.19 -3.7 0.0002 0.95
HoNOS (E) 11.6 15 -2.6 0.0085 0.81
HoNOS (S) 7.8 14.25 -3.9 0.0000 0.97
EC 518.4 98.6 5.5 0 0.97
Note: DES - Dissociative Experiences Scale; TSC-40 - Trauma Symptom 
Checklist-40; HoNOS(E) - version for external evaluation of HoNOS 
(mean),  HoNOS(S) - self-rating version of HoNOS (mean), EC- day 
dosages of antipsychotic medication in equivalents of chlorpromazine 
(mean in mg); r - standardized effect size.
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Table 4. Spearman correlation coefficients between use of antipsychotics, HoNOS, DES and TSC-40 in schizophrenia 
and BPD.
EC HoNOS(E) HoNOS(S) DES DES-AB DES-AM DES-DD
Sch BPD Sch BPD Sch BPD Sch BPD Sch BPD Sch BPD Sch BPD
HoNOS 




0.22 0.28 0.48 0.7
―
DES 0.17 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.53 0.52 ―
DES-
AB 0.08 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.47 0.51 0.88 0.84
―
DES-




0.03 0.37 0.53 0.35 0.65 0.4 0.8 0.77 0.61 0.44 0.36 0.48 ―
TSC-40 0.03 0.08 0.41 0.56 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.28 0.38 0.75 0.43
Note: Values at p0.05 are in bold, Fisher Z higher than 0.05; EC-day dosages of antipsychotic medication in equivalents of 
chlorpromazine (mg), HoNOS(E) - version for external evaluation of HoNOS,  HoNOS(S) - self-rating version of HoNOS, 
DES: Dissociative Experiences Scale, DES-AB - factor of absorption in DES, DES-AM - factor of amnesia in DES, DES-DD -
factor for depersonalization/derealization of DES, TSC-40 - Trauma Symptom Checklist-40.
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2.2.4. Discussion
Our results show that dissociative symptoms and symptoms of traumatic stress 
are significantly correlated in patients with BPD and in those with schizophrenia. 
The data also show that symptoms of traumatic stress are higher in BPD than in 
schizophrenia, which is in agreement with the findings of other (Kingdon et al., 
2010; Putnam et al., 1996; Brunner et al., 2004). 
On the other hand, DES and TSC-40 scores were significantly correlated with 
symptoms of psychosis in both disorders and, as in other studies of patients with 
schizophrenia, symptoms of traumatic stress were associated with psychotic 
symptoms (Read et al., 2005; Ross et al., 1994), higher levels of anxiety, and other 
psychopathological symptoms (Lysaker and Salyers, 2007; Lysaker et al., 2001; 
Lysaker et al., 2004; Janssen et al., 2004; Renard et al., 2012). In agreement with 
other studies, we also found that dissociation in schizophrenia is closely related to 
symptoms of trauma (Sar et al., 2010; Schafer et al., 2012; Moskowitz et al., 2009; 
Ross, 2009; Spitzer et al., 1997; Vogel et al., 2006; 2009a,b). Similar relationships be-
tween stress and dissociation have also been found in patients with BPD 
(Korzekwa et al., 2009a; Howel and Blizard, 2009).
An interesting finding of this study was the correlation between doses of anti-
psychotics measured in EC and dissociative symptoms in patients with BPD. This 
result suggests a specific psychotropic effect of antipsychotic medication in these 
patients. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been reported in the scientific 
literature before. Because our patients had different medication histories, it is nec-
essary to investigate the possible relationship between medication and dissocia-
tive symptoms further in follow-up studies that could explain certain details and 
specific influences of medication on neurotransmitter systems. Nevertheless, the 
statistical finding of this relationship in the BPD group but not in schizophrenia 
group is of interest although further research is necessary. The possible influence 
of medication on dissociative symptoms might reflect the extremely important 
role of stress in BPD. According to current data, stress represents a more signifi-
cant factor in BPD etiology than in schizophrenia (Weber et al., 2009; Barnow et 
al., 2009). Recent data show that antipsychotic treatment likely decreases activa-
tion of the anterior cingulate cortex (Yan et al., 2012; Yücel et al., 2007). In this con-
text it is possible that conscious conflicting (Botvinick et al., 2004; Kerns et al., 
2005) experiences due to antipsychotic medication in BPD may decrease conscious 
awareness of conflicting stressful experiences and cause their dissociation that 
may produce the dissociative symptoms measured by the DES. Although this in-
terpretation is currently speculative, it might be useful for further research that 
could have significant consequences for the treatment of patients with BPD.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
44
2.2.5. Conclusion and perspectives
These results support  the conceptual but empirically rare findings concerning 
the important role   of dissociative processes in  schizophrenia  and BPD  and  the 
specific relationship  between them. A novel  contribution of this study that needs 
further research is the significant finding that manifestations of dissociative symp-
toms might be specifically linked to antipsychotic medication in patients with BPD 
but not in those with schizophrenia.
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2.3. CONCLUSIONS
In the presented experimental studies we aimed at finding relationships be-
tween psychological splitting or dissociation in schizophrenia on one side and 
other cognitive dysfunctions like semantic memory disorganization or symptoms 
on the other side. A way how to extend this type of research is to take into account  
also another perspectives how to study psychological splitting in schizophrenia. 
Bleuler’s concept of splitting is also closely linked to the mind’s metacognitive 
abilities (Lysaker et al., 2013a). As indicated by Moskowitz (2008), when Bleuler 
proposed disturbances of associations as the core feature of schizophrenia he did 
not refer merely to confusion due to the intrusion of unrelated ideas into thought 
but to the fundamental loss of the ability to “associational synthesis” (p. 44) which 
reduced the understanding of oneself as an embodied agent to a set of fragments 
which no longer served as a guide for goal directed activity.  Bleuler assumed that 
this lack of synthesis had an organic origin but could also serve as a proximate 
cause of dysfunction. Bleuler presented detailed accounts of schizophrenia pa-
tients no longer able to function socially or vocationally and the loss of the ability 
to synthesize associations into larger images of oneself and others which then re-
sults in metacognitive dysfunction. In that way we can assess metacognition as a 
reciprocal measure to splitting.
Metacognition as a psychological process is defined as a spectrum of mental 
activities that involves thinking about thinking, ranging from discrete mental ac-
tivities such as thinking about a specific isolated thought to more synthetic acts in 
which context of intentions, thoughts, feelings, and connections between events, 
are integrated into larger complex representations of self and others including also 
a reflection about that larger representation (Lysaker et al., 2013a). Metacognition 
in its synthetic form implies how basic elements of experience are recognized and 
then synthesized into complex wholes and in that way synthetic metacognitive 
acts also affect life in a different manner giving meaning to events, and thus, sup-
plying reasons why to carry out a certain act and how to resolve dilemmas in the 
realm of the unique psychology of oneself and the others. Metacognition is related 
to the concept of mentalization (Bateman and Fonagy, 2006), though the latter 
construct considers that disruptions of the above mentioned psychological pro-
cesses happen in the context of disturbed attachment.  Synthetic metacognitive ac-
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tivities allow persons to form evolving and flexible representations for themselves 
and others and thus form a basis for the ability to regulate affect and behavior.
Impaired metacogniction has been found in both earlier and later forms of 
schizophrenia (Lysaker et al., 2012b; Vohs et al., 2014). Disturbed metacognition is 
related with negative symptoms (Lysaker et al., 2005a; McLeod et al., 2014; Nicolo 
et al. 2012), intrinsic motivation (Tas et al. 2012; Vohs and Lysaker, 2014), func-
tional competence (Lysaker et al., 2011a,b), subjective sense of recovery (Kukla et 
al., 2013), stigma resistance (Nabors et al., 2014), therapeutic alliance (Davis et al., 
2011), vocational function (Lysaker et al., 2010a), and interpersonal relationships 
(Lysaker et al, 2010b; Lysaker et al, 2011).
Thus concept of deficit synthetic metacognition closely related to splitting or 
mental desorganization shows many links to symptoms and functioning in schiz-
ophrenia patients. For future research it would be advantageous to combine both 
approaches, splitting and deficit synthetic metacognition, and make use of meth-
ods of assessment of metacognition in studies concerning splitting and neural 
complexity.  
Synthetic metacognition is assessed by analyzing discourse. The assessment is 
derived from a spontaneously generated speech sample in which persons discuss 
their lives and personal understanding of the situations they have faced. That 
speech sample is obtained through a semi-structured interview called the Indiana 
Psychiatry Illness Interview (IPII). The IPII asks the participant for their account or 
narrative of who they are as a person and also of their experience with psychiatric 
challenges. It thus allows for a life story to be told, in which there are opportuni-
ties for participants to spontaneously reveal how they think about themselves. To 
quantify synthetic metacognitive capacity within IPII narratives, the Metacogni-
tion Assessment Scale – Abbreviated [MAS-A] is used (Lysaker et al., 2005b). The 
MAS-A contains four scales. In each scale higher scores reflect abilities to perform 
increasingly complex synthetic acts. 
The concept of synthetic metacognition links also splitting in schizophrenia in 
novel  trends in psychoterapy of this disorder. Psychotherapeutic approaches di-
rected to integration of splitted parts of mental content or to fostering of stabile 
mental representation in schizophrenia has been applied in the last decades, e.g. 
complex forms of cognitive remediation (Roder et al., 2011; McGurk et al., 
2007), supportive psychodynamic approaches (Rosenbaum et al., 2012), psychoan-
alytic psychodrama (Corcos et al., 2012), self-complexity (Martens, 2009). Consid-
ering the possible close relationship between defective synthetic metacognition 
and splitting we can expect further progress from recent forms of therapy related 
to improvement of synthetic metacognition (Hasson-Ohayon, 2012; Lysaker et al., 
2011c; Lysaker et al., 2013c; Brent, 2009).  The aim of this novel treatments is to 
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
47
help persons to form more complex and integrated representations about them-
selves and others and use this knowledge to respond to psychological problems.
Continuus research that would further clarify mutual relatedness between 
brain functions, splitting and metacognition might enable to follow a progress in 
psychotherapy not only by means of assessment on psychological level, but also to 
apply more measurements on neural level, e.g. EDA, EEG, to track neural binding 
processes interconnected with better integration on a psychological level.  
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3. APPENDIX - PSYCHOMETRIC MEASURES
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3.2. DISSOCIATIVE EXPERIENCE SCALE - DES
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3.3. HEALTH OF THE NATIONS - HONOS
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3.4. TRAUMA SYMPTOMS CHECKLIST - TSC-40
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
62
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
63
4. REFERENCES
Allen, H.A., Liddle, P.F., Frith, C.D., 1993. Negative features, retrieval processes, 
and verbal fluency in schizophrenia. Br. J. Psychiatry 163, 769–75.
Andreasen, N.C., 1997. Linking mind and brain in the study of mental illnesses: a 
project for a scientific psychopathology. Science 275, 586-93. 
Andreasen, N.C., Paradiso, S., O´Leary, D.S., 1998. “Cognitive Dysmetria” as an In-
tegrative Theory of Schizophrenia: A Dysfunction in Cortical-Subcortical-
Cerebellar Circuitry?  Schizophr. Bull. 24, 203-218. 
Anzieu, D., 1974. A Discussion of the Paper by Gisela Pankow on “The Body Image 
in Psychosis”. Int. J. Psychoanal. 55, 415-416.
Anzieu, D., 1993. Autistic Phenomena and the Skin Ego. Psychoanal. Inq. 13, 42-48. 
Balduzzi, D., Tononi, G., 2008. Integrated information in discrete dynamical sys-
tems: motivation and theoretical framework. PLoS Comput. Biol. 4:e1000091. 
Barnow, S., Arens, E.A., Sieswerda, S., Dinu-Biringer, R., Spitzer, C., Lang, S., 2010. 
Borderline personality disorder and psychosis: a review. Curr. Psychiatry Rep. 
12(3), 186-95. doi: 10.1007/s11920-010-0107-9.
Bateman, A.W., Fonagy, P., 2006. Mentalization-Based Treatment for Borderline Person-
ality Disorder: A Practical Guide. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Benedetti, G., Peciccia, M., 1998. The Ego Structure and the Self-Identity of the 
Schizophrenic Human and the Task of Psychoanalysis. Int. Forum Psychoanal.
7, 169-174.
Bernstein, E.M., Putnam, F.W., 1986. Development, reliability, and validity of a dis-
sociation scale. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 174(12), 727-35.
Beutel, M.E., Dietrich, S., Stark, R., Brendel, G., Silbersweig, D., 2004. Pursuit of the 
emerging dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience: clinical and re-
search perspectives.  Int. J. Psychoanal. 85, 1493-6.
Bion, W.R., 1957. Differentiation of the Psychotic from the Non-Psychotic Personali-
ties. Int. J. Psychoanal. 38, 266-275.
Bion, W.R., 1959. Attacks on linking. Int. J. Psychoanal. 40, 308-315.
Blass, R. B., Carmeli, Z., 2007. The case against neuropsychoanalysis: On fallacies 
underlying psychoanalysis' latest scientific trend and its negative impact on 
psychoanalytic discourse. Int. J. Psychoanal. 88, 19-40.
Blatt, S.J., Auerbach, J.S., 2001. Mental Representation, Severe Psychopathology, 
and the Therapeutic Process.  J. Am. Psychoanal. Assoc. 49, 113-159.
Bleger, J., 1974. Schizophrenia, Autisms, and Symbiosis. Contemp. Psychoanal. 10, 19-
25.
Bleuler, E., 1911/1950. Dementia praecox or the group of schizophrenias, J. Zinkin 
(Trans.). International Universities Press, New York, NY.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
64
Bleuler, E., 1919/1906. Consciousness and association, in: Jung, C. G. (Ed.), Studies 
in word association: Experiments in the diagnosis of psychopathological conditions 
carried out at the psychiatric clinic of the University of Zurich,  Eder, M. D. 
(Trans.).  Moffat, Yard and Company, New York, NY, pp. 266-296.
Bleuler, E., 1924. Textbook of psychiatry, Brill, A. A., (Trans.). The Macmillan Compa-
ny, New York, NY.
Bob, P., 2000. Dissociation processes and their measurement. [Disociativni procesy 
a jejich mereni] Ceska Slov. Psychiatr. 96(6), 301-309.
Bob, P., 2008. Pain, dissociation and subliminal self-representations. Conscious Cogn.
17, 355-369.
Bob, P., 2011. Brain, mind and consciousness: advances in neuroscience research. Spring-
er, New York, NY.
Bob, P., 2012. Dissociation, epileptiform discharges and chaos in the brain: Toward 
a neuroscientific theory of dissociation. Act. Nerv. Super. 54, 84-107.
Bob, P., Mashour, G.A., 2011. Schizophrenia, dissociation, and consciousness. Con-
scious Cogn. 20, 1042-9.
Bob, P., Palus, M., Susta, M., Glaslova, K., 2008. EEG phase synchronization in pa-
tients with paranoid schizophrenia. Neurosci. Lett. 447, 73-77.
Bob, P., Ptacek, R., Paclt, I., et al., 2003. Dissociation and symptoms of complex par-
tial epilepsy in depressed patients. [Disociace a symptomy komplexní 
parciální epilepsie u depresivních pacientů] Ceska Slov. Psychiatr. 99(2), 82-88.
Bob, P., Susta, M., Chladek, J., Glaslova, K., Palus, M., 2009. Chaos in schizophrenia 
associations, reality or metaphor? Int. J. Psychophysiol. 73, 179-185.
Bob, P., Susta, M., Glaslova, K., Boutros, N.N., 2010. Dissociative symptoms and in-
terregional EEG cross-correlations in paranoid schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res.
177, 37-40.
Bob, P., Svetlak, M., 2011. Dissociative states and neural complexity. Brain  Cogn. 75, 
188-95.
Botvinick, M.M., Cohen, J.D., Carter, C.S., 2004. Conflict monitoring and anterior 
cingulate cortex: an update. Trends Cogn Sci. 8(12), 539-46. 
Breakspear, M., 2006. The nonlinear theory of schizophrenia. Aust.N.Z.J.Psychiatry
40, 20-35.
Bremner, J. D., Elzinga, B., Schmahl, C., Vermetten, E., 2007. Structural and func-
tional plasticity of the human brain in posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Prog.Brain Res. 167, 171-186.
Brent, B., 2009. Mentalization based psychodynamic psychotherapy for psychosis. J. 
Clin. Psychol. 65, 803–814.
Breuer, J., Freud, S., 1895. Studies in hysteria. Basic Books, New York. 376 p.
Breuer, J., 1893. Theoretical from Studies on Hysteria. Standard Edition 2,183-251.
Brillouin, L., 1956. Science and information theory. Academic Press, New York, NY.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
65
Bromberg, P.M., 1995. Psychoanalysis, Dissociation, and Personality Organization 
Reflections on Peter Goldberg’s Essay. Psychoanal. Dialogues 5, 511-526.
Bromberg, P.M., 2003. On Being One’s Dream: Some Reflections on Robert 
Bosnak´s “Embodied Imagination”. Contemp. Psychoanal. 39, 697-710.
Bromberg, P.M., 2009. Multiple Self-States, the Relational Mind, and Dissociation: A 
Psychoanalytic Perspective, in: Dell, P. F., O´Neil, J. A. (Eds.), Dissociation and 
the dissociative disorders. DSM-V and Beyond. Routledge, New York, NY, pp. 
637-652. 
Brook, J.A., 1992. Freud and Splitting. Int.J.Psychoanal. 19, 335-350.
Brunner, R., Parzer, P., Schmitt, R., Rescha, F., 2004. Dissociative Symptoms in 
Schizophrenia: A Comparative Analysis of Patients with Borderline Personal-
ity Disorder and Healthy Controls. Psychopathology 37, 281–284.
Burnham, D.L., 1969. Schizophrenia and object relations, in:  Burnhan, D.L., Glad-
stone, A.I., Gibson, R.W. (Eds.) Schizophrenia and the need-fear dilemma. Interna-
tional Universities Press, New-York, NY, pp. 15-41.
Bychowski, G., 1956. The Ego and the Introjects. Psychoanal. Q. 25, 11-36.
Caparrós, N., 1999. Splitting and Disavowal in Group Psychotherapy of Psychosis, 
in: Schermer, V.L., Pines, M. (Eds.), Group Psychotherapy of the Psychoses. Jessi-
ca Kingsley Publishers: London and Philadelphia, PA, pp. 83-96.
Ciompi, L., 1982. Affekt logik: Über die Struktur der Psyche und Ihre Entwicklung. Ein 
Beitrag zur Schizophrenieforschung. Klett-Cotta: Stuttgart, Germany.
Corcos, M., Jeammet, P., Morel, A., Chabert, C., De Lara, A.C. 2012. Current Devel-
opments in the Practice of Individual Psychoanalytic Psychodrama in France. 
Int. J. Psycho-Anal. 93, 561-584.
Crawford, H.J., 1994. Brain dynamics and hypnosis. Int. J. Clin. Exp. Hypn. 42, 204-
232.
Daskalakis, Z.J., Fitzgerald, P.B., Christensen, B.K., 2007. The role of cortical inhibi-
tion in the pathophysiology and treatment of schizophrenia. Brain Res. Rev.
56, 427-42.
Davis, A.V., Paulsen, J.S., Heaton, R.K., Jeste, D.V., 1995. Assessment of the seman-
tic network in chronic schizophrenia. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc. 1, 132. 
Davis, L.W., Eicher, A.C., Lysaker, P.H.  2011. Metacognition as a predictor of ther-
apeutic alliance over 26 weeks of psychotherapy in schizophrenia. Schizophr. 
Res. 129, 85-90.
DeSisto, M., Harding, C.M., McCormick, R.V., Ashikaga, T., Brooks, G.W., 1995. 
The Maine and Vermont three decade studies of serious mental illness. Br. J. 
Psychiatry 167, 338-342. 
Diederen, K.M., Neggers, S.F., Daalman, K., et al., 2010. Deactivation of the 
parahippocampal gyrus preceding auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. 
Am. J. Psychiatry 167, 427-35.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
66
Dimaggio, G., Lysaker, P.H., Carcione, A., Nicolò, G., Semerari, A., 2008. Know 
yourself and you shall know the other... to a certain extent: multiple paths of 
influence of self-reflection on mindreading. Conscious Cogn. 17, 778-89. doi: 
10.1016/j.concog.2008.02.005.
Edelson, M., 1986. The Convergence of Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience:—Illusion 
and Reality. Contemp. Psychoanal. 22, 479-519.
Elbert, T., Lutzenberger, W., Rockstroh, B., Berg, P., Cohen, R., 1992. Physical as-
pects of the EEG in schizophrenics. Biol. Psychiatry 32, 595-606.
Ellenberger, H.F., 1970. The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of 
Dynamic Psychiatry. Basic Books, New York, NY. 976 p. 
Elliott, D.M., Briere, J., 1992. Sexual abuse trauma among professional women: val-
idating the Trauma Symptom Checklist-40 (TSC-40). Child Abuse Negl. 16(3), 
391-8.
Fairbairn, W.R., 1941. A Revised Psychopathology of the Psychoses and Psycho-
neuroses. Int. J. Psychoanal. 22, 50-279.
Falzeder E., 2007. The story of an ambivalent relationship: Sig-
mund Freud and Eugen Bleuler. J. Anal. Psychol. 52, 343-68.
Farrer, C., Franck, N., Frith, C.D., et al., 2004. Neural correlates of action attribution 
in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res.: Neuroimaging 131, 31-44.
Feinberg, I., 1978. Efference copy and corollary discharge: implications for thinking 
and its disorders. Schizophr. Bull. 4, 636-640. 
Feinberg, I., Guazzelli, M., 1999. Schizophrenia--a disorder of the corollary dis-
charge systems that integrate the motor systems of thought with the sensory 
systems of consciousness. Br.J. Psychiatry 174, 196-204.
Ford, J.M., Gray, M., Faustman, W.O., Heinks, T.H., Mathalon, D.H., 2005. Reduced 
gamma-band coherence to distorted feedback during speech when what you 
say is not what you hear. Int. J. Psychophysiol. 57, 143-150.
Ford, J.M., Gray, M., Faustman, W.O., Roach, B.J., Mathalon, D.H., 2007. Dissecting 
corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia. Psychophysiology 44, 522-
529. 
Ford, J.M., Mathalon, D.H., Heinks, T., Kalba, S., Faustman, W.O., Roth, W.T., 2001. 
Neurophysiological evidence of corollary discharge dysfunction in schizo-
phrenia. Am. J.Psychiatry 158, 2069-71. 
Ford, J.M., Roach, B.J., Faustman, W.O., Mathalon, D.H., 2008. Out-of-synch and 
out-of-sorts: dysfunction of motor-sensory communication in schizophrenia. 
Biol. Psychiatry 63, 736-43.
Franceschi, P., 2013. Polythematic delusions and logico-theoretical vs. experimen-
talist turn of mind. Act. Nerv. Super. (Praha) 55, 67-73.
Freedman, N., 1980. On Splitting and Its Resolution. Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought 3, 
237-266.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
67
Freeman, T., 1997.  Mental Economics and Psychoanalytic Theories of Psychotic 
Phenomena. Psychoanal. Study Child  52, 029-041.
Freud, S., 1895. Project for a Scientific Psychology. Standard Edition 1, 281-391.
Freud, S., 1896. Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defence. Standard Edi-
tion 3,157-185.
Freud, S., 1911. Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case 
of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides). Standard Edition 12, 1-82. 
Freud, S., 1912. A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis. Standard Edition 12, 
255-266. 
Freud, S., 1914. On Narcissism: An Introduction, Standard Edition 14, 67-102.
Freud, S., 1915a. Instincts and their Vicissitudes. Standard Edition 14, 109-140. 
Freud, S., 1915b. The Unconscious. Standard Edition 14, 159-215. 
Freud, S., 1923. The Ego and the Id. Standard Edition 19, 1-66. 
Freud, S., 1938. An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. Standard Edition 23, 139-208. 
Fries, P., 2005. A mechanism for cognitive dynamics: Neuronal communication 
through neuronal coherence. Trends Cogn. Sci.  9,  474-480. 
Friston, K.J., 1996. Theoretical neurobiology and schizophrenia. Br. Med. Bull. 52, 
644-655. 
Friston, K.J., 1998. The disconnection hypothesis. Schizophr. Res. 30, 115-125. 
Friston, K.J., 2002. Dysfunctional connectivity in schizophrenia. World Psychiatry 1, 
66-71.
Garfield, D.A., 2005. The Vertical Split in Neurosis and Psychosis: Motor Acts and 
the Infrastructure of Agency. Psychoanal.  Rev. 92, 249-270.
Glover, E., 1943. The Concept of Dissociation. Int. J. Psychoanal. 24, 7-13. 
Glover, E., 1961. Some Recent Trends in Psychoanalytic Theory. Psychoanal. Q. 30, 
86-107.
Goldberg, T.E., Aloia, M.S., Gourovitch, M.L., et al., 1998. Cognitive substrates of 
thought disorder, I: The semantic system. Am J Psychiatry 155, 1671-6.
Goldberg, T.E., Weinberger, D.R., 2000. Thought disorder in schizophrenia: a reap-
praisal of older formulations and an overview of some recent studies. Cogn. 
Neuropsychiatry 5, 1–19.
Gordon, J.A., Hen, R., 2004. The serotonergic system and anxiety. NeuroMolecular 
Med. 5, 27-40.
Gottdiener W.H., Haslam N., 2002. The benefits of individual psychotherapy for 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia: a meta-analytic review. Ethical Hum. 
Sci. and Serv. 4, 163-187. 
Gould, J.R., Prentice, N.M., Ainslie, R.C., 1996. The Splitting Index: Construction of 
a Scale Measuring the Defense Mechanism o Splitting. J. Pers. Assess.  66: 
1414-1430.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
68
Gray, J.A., Feldon, J., Rawlins, J.N.P., Hemsley, D.R., Smith, A.D., 1991. The neuro-
psychology of schizophrenia. Behav. Brain Sci. 18, 617–680. 
Gray, J.A., Roth, B., 2007. Molecular targets for treating cognitive dysfunction in 
schizophrenia. Schizophr. Bull. 33, 1100-19.
Grotstein, J.S., 1977a. The Psychoanalytic Concept of Schizophrenia: I. the Dilemma. 
Int.  J. Psychoanal. 58, 403-425.
Grotstein, J.S., 1977b. The Psychoanalytic Concept of Schizophrenia: II. Reconcilia-
tion. Int.J. Psychoanal. 58, 427-452. 
Grotstein, J.S., 1990. Nothingness, Meaninglessness, Chaos, and the “Black Hole” I 
– The Importance of Nothingness, Meaninglessness, and Chaos in Psychoa-
nalysis. Contemp. Psychoanal. 26, 257-290.
Harding, C.M., 2003. Changes in schizophrenia across time: paradoxes, patterns, 
and predictors, in: Cohen C. (ed.) Schizophrenia into Later Life: Treatment, Re-
search and Policy. American Psychiatric Publishing, Washington, DC, pp. 19-
42.
Harrison, G., Hopper, K., Craig, T., et al., 2001. Recovery form psychotic illness: a 
15- and 25 year international follow-up study. Br. J. Psychiatry 178, 506-517. 
Hasson-Ohayon, I. 2012. Integrating cognitive behavioral-based therapy with an in-
ter-subjective approach: Addressing metacognitive deficits among people 
with schizophrenia. J. Psychother. Integr., 22, 356-374.
Hemsley, D.R., 2005. The development of a cognitive model of schizophrenia: plac-
ing it in context. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 29, 977-88.
Henry, J.D., Crawford, J.R., 2005. A meta-analytic review of verbal fluency deficits 
in schizophrenia relative to other neurocognitive deficits. Cogn. Neuropsychia-
try 10, 1-33.
Hilgard, E.R., 1986. Divided Consciousness. Multiple Control in Human Thought and 
Action. Wiley, New York, NY. 318 p.
Himelhoch, S., Taylor, S.F., Goldman, R.S., Tandon, R., 1996. Frontal lobe tasks, an-
tipsychotic medication, and schizophrenic syndromes. Biol. Psychiatry 39, 
227–9.
Hinshelwood, R.D., 2008. Repression and Splitting: Towards a Method of Concep-
tual Comparison. Int. J. Psychoanal. 89, 503-521. 
Hoffman, R.E., Kirstein, L., Stopek, S., Cicchetti, D.V., 1982. Apprehending schizo-
phrenic discourse: a structural analysis of the listener’s task. Brain Lang. 15, 
207–33.
Hoffman, R.E., McGlashan, T.H., 1993. Parallel Distributed Processing and the 
Emergence of Schizophrenic Symptoms. Schizophr. Bull. 18, 119-140.
Howel, E.F., Blizard, R.A., 2009. Chronic relational trauma disorder: a new diagnos-
tic scheme for borderline personality and the spectrum of dissociative disor-
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
69
ders. In: Dell, P.F., O´Neil, J.A. (Eds.) Dissociation and the dissociative disorders. 
DSM-V and beyond. Routledge, New York, NY. pp. 495-510.
Janssen, I., Krabbendam, L., Bak, et al., 2004. Childhood abuse as a risk factor for 
psychotic experiences. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 109, 38–45.
Jones, E.G., 1993. GABAergic neurons and their role in cortical plasticity in pri-
mates. Cereb. Cortex 3, 361-72.
Jung, C.G., 1909. The Psychology of Dementia Praecox. The Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease Publishing Company, New York, NY.
Kandel, E.R., 1999. Biology and the future of psychoanalysis: A new intellectual 
framework for psychiatry revisited. Am. J. Psychiatry 156, 505-524.
Katan, M., 1954. The Importance of the Non-Psychotic Part of the Personality in 
Schizophrenia. Int. J. Psychoanal. 35, 119-128.
Keefe, R.S.E, Arnold, M.C., Bayen, U.J., McEvoy, J.P., Wilson, W.H., 2002. Source-
monitoring deficits for self-generated stimuli in schizophrenia: multinomial 
modeling of data from three sources. Schizophr. Res. 57, 51-67.
Kent, G.H., Rosonoff, A.J., 1910. A study of associations in insanity. American Jour-
nal of Insanity 66/67, 37–34, 317–390.
Kernberg, O.F., 1975. Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism. Janson Ar-
onson, New York, NY. 376 p.
Kernberg, O.F., 1982. Self, Ego, Affects, and Drives. J. Am. Psychoanal. Assoc. 30, 893-
917.
Kerns, J.G., Cohen, J.D., MacDonald, A.W. 3rd, Cho, R.Y., Stenger, V.A., Carter, 
C.S., 2004. Anterior cingulate conflict monitoring and adjustments in control. 
Science 303(5660), 1023-6.
Kerns, J.G., Cohen, J.D., MacDonald, A.W. 3rd, et al., 2005. Decreased conflict- and 
error-related activity in the anterior cingulate cortex in subjects with schizo-
phrenia. Am. J. Psychiatry 162(10), 1833-9.
Kingdon, D.G., Ashcroft, K., Bhandari, B., et al., 2010. Schizophrenia and Borderline 
Personality Disorder Similarities and Differences in the Experience of Audito-
ry Hallucinations, Paranoia, and Childhood Trauma. J. Nerv. Men.t Dis 198, 
399–403.
Klein, M., 1946. Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms. Int. J.  Psychoanal. 27, 99-110.
Klonowski, W., Jernajczyk, W., Niedzielska, K., Rydz, A., Stepień, R., 1999. Quanti-
tative measure of complexity of EEG signal dynamics.  Acta Neurobiol. Exp. 
(Wars) 59, 315-21. 
Kohut, H., 1971. The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic 
Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders. International Universities Press, 
New York, NY. 384 p.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
70
Korzekwa, M.I., Dell, P.F., Links, P.S., Thabane, L., Fougere, P., 2009. Dissociation 
in Borderline Personality Disorder: A Detailed Look. J. Trauma Dissociation 10, 
346–367. 
Kruglikov, I., Rudy, B., 2008. Perisomatic GABA release and thalamocortical inte-
gration onto neocortical excitatory cells are regulated by neuromodulators. 
Neuron 58, 911-24.
Kukla, M., Lysaker, P.H., Salyers, M.P., 2013. Do persons with schizophrenia who 
have better metacognitive capacity also have a stronger subjective experience 
of recovery? Psychiatry Res. 209, 381-5. doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2013.04.014.
Lee, K.H., Williams, L.M., Breakspear, M., Gordon, E., 2003. Synchronous Gamma 
activity: a review and contribution to an integrative neuroscience model of 
schizophrenia. Brain Res. Rev. 41, 57-78. 
Lerner, H.D., Lerner, P.M., 1982. A Comparative Study of Defensive Structure in 
Neurotic, Borderline and Schizophrenic Patients. Psychoanal. Contemp. 
Thought 5, 77-115.
Lichtenberg, J.D, Slap, J.W., 1973. Notes on the Concept of Splitting and the Defense 
Mechanism of the Splitting of Representations. J. Am.Psychoanal. Assoc. 21, 
772-787.
London, N.J., 1973. An Essay on Psychoanalytic Theory: Two Theories of Schizo-
phrenia. Part I: Review and Critical Assessment of the Development of the 
Two Theories. Int. J. Psychoanal. 54, 169-178.
Lustman, J., 1977.  On Splitting. Psychoanal. Study Child 32, 119-153.
Lysaker, P.H., Bob, P., Pec, O., et al. 2013a. Metacognition as a link which connects 
brain to behavior in schizophrenia. Transl. Neurosci, 4, 368-377.
Lysaker, P.H., Buck, K.D., Caricione, A, et al. 2011c. Addressing Metacognitive Ca-
pacity for self reflection in the Psychotherapy for Schizophrenia: A conceptu-
al model of the key tasks and processes. Psychol. and Psychother. 84, 58-69.
Lysaker, P.H., Buck, K.D., Fogley, R.L., et al.,  2012a. The Mutual Development of 
Intersubjectivity and Metacognitive Capacity in the Psychotherapy for Per-
sons with Schizophrenia. J. Contemp. Psychother. 43, 63-72.  
Lysaker P.H., Carcione A., Dimaggio G., et al., 2005b. Metacognition amidst narra-
tives of self and illness in schizophrenia: associations with insight, 
neurocognition, symptom and function, Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 112, 64-71.
Lysaker, P.H., Dimaggio, G., Carcione, A., et al. 2010a. Metacognition and schizo-
phrenia: The capacity for self-reflectivity as a predictor for prospective as-
sessments of work performance over six months. Schizophrenia Res. 122, 124-
130.
Lysaker, P.H., Erickson, M.A., Buck, B., et al., 2011a. Metacognition and social func-
tion in schizophrenia: Associations over a period of five months. Cogn. Neu-
ropsychiatry 16, 241-55.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
71
Lysaker, P.H., Gumley, A., Luedtke, B., et al., 2013c. Social cognition and metacog-
nition in schizophrenia: evidence of their independence and linkage with 
outcomes. Acta Psychiatr. Scand.  127, 239-47. doi: 10.1111/acps.12012. 
Lysaker, P.H., McCormick, B.P., Snethen, G., et al. 2011b. Metacognition and social 
function in schizophrenia: Associations of mastery with functional skills 
competence. Schizophr. Res. 131, 214-218.
Lysaker, P.H., Meyer, P.S., Evans, J.D., Clements, C.A., Marks, K.A., 2001. Child-
hood sexual trauma and psychosocial functioning in adults with schizophre-
nia. Psychiatr. Serv. 52, 1485–1488.
Lysaker, P.H., Nees, M.A., Lancaster, R.S., Davis, L.W., 2004. Vocational function 
among persons with schizophrenia with and without history of childhood 
sexual trauma. J. Trauma Stress. 17, 435–438.
Lysaker, P.H., Ringer, J.M., Buck, K.D., et al. 2012b. Metacognitive and social cogni-
tion deficits in patients with significant psychiatric and medical adversity: A 
comparison between participants with schizophrenia and a sample of partici-
pants who are HIV-positive. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis.  200, 130-134. 
Lysaker, P.H., Salyers, M.P., 2007. Anxiety symptoms in schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders: associations with social function, positive and negative symptoms, 
hope and trauma history. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 116, 290–298.
Lysaker, P.H., Shea, A.M., Buck, K.D., et al. 2010b. Metacognition as a mediator of 
the effects of impairments in neurocognition on social function in schizo-
phrenia spectrum disorders. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 122, 405-413.
Lysaker, P.H., Vohs, J., Hillis, J.D., et al., 2013b. Poor insight into schizophrenia: 
contributing factors, consequences and emerging treatment approaches. Ex-
pert Rev. Neurother. 13, 785-93. doi: 10.1586/14737175. 2013.811150. 
Lysaker, P.H., Wickett, A., Davis, L.W. 2005a. Narrative qualities in schizophrenia: 
associations with impairments in neurocognition and negative symptoms. J. 
Nerv. Ment. Dis. 193, 244-249.
Manschreck, T.C., Maher, B.A., Ader, D.N., 1981. Formal thought disorder, the type 
token ratio and disturbed voluntary movement in schizophrenia. Br. J. Psy-
chiatry 139, 7–15.
Manschreck, T.C., Maher, B.A., Rucklos, M.E., White, M.T., 1979. The predictability 
of thought disordered speech in schizophrenic patients. Br. J. Psychiatry 134,  
595–601.
Marker, D., 2002. Model Theory: An Introduction. Springer, New York, NY.
Martens, W.H. 2009. The role of self-complexity in reducing harmful insight among 
persons with schizophrenia. Theoretical and therapeutic implications. Am. 
J.Psychother. 63 (1), 53-68.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
72
Mazur, B., 2008. When is one thing equal to some other thing? In: Gold B., Simons 
R.A. (Eds.) Proof and other dilemmas: mathematics and philosophy. Mathematical 
Association of America, Washington, DC.
McGurk, S.R., Twamley, E.W., Sitzer, D. I., McHugo, G.J., Mueser, K.T., 2007. A Me-
ta-Analysis of Cognitive Remediation in Schizophrenia. Am. J. Psychiat, 164, 
1791-802.
McLeod, H.J., Gumley, A.I., Macbeth, A., Schwannauer, M., Lysaker, P.H. 2014. 
Metacognitive functioning predicts positive and negative symptoms over 12 
months in first episode psychosis. J. Psychiatr. Res. 54, 109-15. doi: 
10.1016/j.jpsychires.2014.03.018.  
Mishara, A.L., Lysaker, P.H., Schwartz, M.A., 2014. Self-disturbances in Schizo-
phrenia: History, Phenomenology, and Relevant Findings From Research on 
Metacognition. Schizophr. Bull. 40, 5-12. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbt169. 
Mojtabai, F., Nicholson, R.A., Carpetner, B.N., 1998. Role of psychological treat-
ments in management of schizophrenia: a meta-analytic review of controlled 
outcome studies. Schizophr. Bull. 24, 569-588. 
Moran, L.J., Mefferd Nr. R.B., Kimble Nr. J.P., 1964. Idiodynamic sets in word asso-
ciation. Psychol. Monogr. 78, 1–22.
Moskowitz, A. 2008. Association and dissociation in the historical concept of schiz-
ophrenia. In: Moskowitz, A., Schafer, I., Dorahy, M. (Eds.) Psychosis Trauma 
and Dissociation. John Wiley and Sons, West Sussex, UK, pp. 35-50.
Moskowitz, A., Read, J., Farrelly, S., Rudegeair, T., Williams, O., 2009. Are psychot-
ic symptoms traumatic in origin and dissociative in kind? In: Dell, P.F., 
O´Neil, J.A. (Eds.) Dissociation and the dissociative disorders. DSM-V and beyond.
Routledge, New York, NY, pp. 521-533.
Nabors, L.M., Yanos, P.T., Roe, D., et al. 2014. Stereotype endorsement, metacogni-
tive capacity, and self-esteem as predictors of stigma resistance in persons 
with schizophrenia. Compr. Psychiatry 55, 792-798.
Nicolò, G., Dimaggio, G., Popolo, R., et al. 2012. Associations of metacognition with 
symptoms, insight, and neurocognition in clinically stable outpatients with 
schizophrenia. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 200, 644-647.
Novey, S., 1958. The Meaning of the Concept of Mental Representation of Objects. 
Psychoanal. Q. 27, 57-79.
Ogden, T.H., 1989. On the Concept of an Autistic-Contiguous Position. Int. J. 
Psychoanal. 70, 127-140.
Panksepp, J., Solms, M. 2012. What is neuropsychoanalysis? clinically relevant 
studies of the minded brain. Trends Cogn. Sci. 16, 6-8.  
Park, S., Thakkar, K.N., 2010. “Splitting of the Mind” Revisited: Recent Neuroimag-
ing Evidence for Functional Dysconnection in Schizophrenia and Its Relation 
to Symptoms. Am. J. Psychiatry 167, 366-368.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
73
Paulsen, J.S., Romero, R., Chan, A., Davis, A.V., Heaton, R.K., Jeste, D.V., 1996. Im-
pairment of the semantic network in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res. 63, 109–21.
Paulus, M.P., Braff, D.L., 2003. Chaos and Schizophrenia: Does the Method Fit the 
Madness? Biol. Psychiatry 53, 3-11. 
Pec, O., Cechova, D., Pecova, J., et al., 2009. HoNOS (Health of the Nations Out-
come Scales) - An adaptation of the tool for the assessment of symptoms and 
social functions in serious mentally ill in the Czech conditions and its use 
[HoNOS (Hodnocení zdravotního stavu) - Adaptace nástroje na hodnocení 
symptomů a sociálních funkcí u závažně duševně nemocných v českých 
podmínkách a jeho použití]. Ceska Slov. Psychiatr. 105, 245-249.
Peciccia, M., Benedetti, G., 1996. The Splitting between Separate and Symbiotic 
States of the Self in the Psychodynamic of Schizophrenia. Int. Forum 
Psychoanal. 5, 23-37.
Peled, A., 1999. Multiple constraint organization in the brain: A theory for schizo-
phrenia. Brain Res. Bull. 49, 245-250.
Peled, A., 2008.  Neuroanalysis. Bridging the gap between Neuroscience, Psychoanalysis 
and Psychiatry. Routledge, London, England.
Pestalozzi, J., 2003. The symbolic and concrete: Psychotic adolescents in psychoana-
lytic psychotherapy. Int. Forum Psychoanal. 84, 733-753.
Piagnol, A., Oïta, M., Montreuil, M., Granger, B., Lubart, T., 2003. La fragmentation 
de l'espace de représentation dans les schizophrénies. Encephale 35, 297-303.
Poulet, J.F., Hedwig, B., 2007. New insights into corollary discharges mediated by 
identified neural pathways. Trends Neurosci. 30, 14-21.
Preiss, M., Laing, H., Rodriguez, M., 2002. Neuropsychological Battery of Prague Psy-
chiatric Center. Clinical examination of basic cognitive functions
[Neuropsychologická baterie Psychiatrického centra Praha. Klinické vyšetření 
základních kognitivních funkcí.] Psychiatrické centrum Praha, Praha.
Ptacek, R., Bob, P., Paclt, I. 2006. Dissociative experiences scale - Czech version 
[Škála disociativních zkušeností - Česká verze] Cesk. Psychol. 50(3), 262-272.
Pulver, S.E., 2003. On the Astonishing Clinical Irrelevance of Neuroscience. J. Am. 
Psychoanal. Assoc. 51,  755-772.
Putnam, F.W., Carlson, E.B., Ross, C.A., et al., 1996. Patterns of dissociation in clini-
cal and nonclinical samples. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 11, 673– 679.
Rainville, P., Hofbauer, R.K., Bushnell, M.C., Duncan, G.H., Price, D.D., 2002. Hyp-
nosis modulates activity in brain structures involved in the regulation of con-
sciousness. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14, 887-901.
Raven, J.C., 1960. Guide to the Standard Progressive Matrices. HK Lewis, London.
Read, J., van Os, J., Morrison, A.P., Ross, C.A., 2005. Childhood trauma, psychosis 
and schizophrenia: a literature review with theoretical and clinical implica-
tions. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 112, 330–350.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
74
Renard, S.B., Pijnenborg, M., Lysaker, P.H. 2012. Dissociation and social cognition 
in schizophrenia spectrum disorder. Schizophr. Res. 137, 219–223.
Reske, M., Habel, U., Kellermann, T., et al., 2009. Differential brain activation dur-
ing facial emotion discrimination in first-episode schizophrenia. J. Psychiatr. 
Res. 43, 592–599.
Robbins, M., 1993. Experiences of Schizophrenia. An Integration of the Personal, Scien-
tific, and Therapeutic. The Guilford Press, New York, NY.
Robbins, M., 2011. The primordial mind in health and illness: a crosscultural perspective.
Routledge, New York, NY.  
Robert, P.H., Lafont, V., Medecin, I., et al., 1998. Clustering and switching strategies 
in verbal fluency tasks: comparison between schizophrenics and healthy 
adults. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc. 4, 539-46. 
Roder, V., Mueller, D.R., Schmidt, S.J. 2011. Effectiveness of Integrated Psychologi-
cal Therapy (IPT ) for Schizophrenia Patients: A Research Update. Schizophr. 
Bull. 37, suppl. 2,  S71–S79.
Rosenbaum, B., Harder, S., Knudsen, P., et al., 2012. Supportive psychodynamic 
psychotherapy versus treatment as usual for first-episode psychosis: two-
year outcome, Psychiatry 75, 331-341.
Rosenfeld, H., 1947. Analysis of a Schizophrenic State with Depersonalization. Int. 
J. Psychoanal. 28, 130-139.
Ross, C., Anderson, G., Clark, P., 1994. Childhood abuse and positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia. Hosp. Community Psychiatry 45, 489–491.
Ross, C.A., 2009.  The theory of dissociative subtype of schizophrenia. In: Dell, P.F., 
O´Neil, J.A. (Eds.) Dissociation and the dissociative disorders. DSM-V and beyond.
Routledge, New York, pp.557-568.
Rotenberg, V.S., Weinberg, I., 1999. Human memory, cerebral hemispheres, and the 
limbic system: a new approach. Genet. Soc. Gen. Psychol. Monogr. 125, 45-70.
Rothstein, J., 1951. Information, measurement, and quantum mechanics. Science 114, 
171–5.
Sammer, G., 1996. Working-memory load and dimensional complexity of the EEG. 
Int. J. Psychophysiol. 24, 173-82.
Sar, V., Taycan, O., Bolat, N., et al., 2010. Childhood Trauma and Dissociation in 
Schizophrenia. Psychopathology 43, 33–40. 
Sas, S.A., 1992. Ambiguity as the Route to Shame. Int. J. Psychoanal. 73, 329-341. 
Satterthwaite, T.D., Wolf, D.H., Loughead, J., et al., 2010. Association of enhanced 
limbic response to threat with decreased cortical facial recognition memory 
response in schizophrenia. Am. J. Psychiatry 167, 418-26.
Schafer, I., Fisher, H.L., Aderhold, V., et al. 2012. Dissociative symptoms in patients 
with schizophrenia: relationships with childhood trauma and psychotic 
symptoms. Compr. Psychiatry 53, 364–371. 
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
75
Scharff, D.E., Birles, E.F. 1997. From Instinct To Self: The Evolution An Implication 
Of W. R. D. Fairbairn´s Theory Of Object Relations. Int. J. Psychoanal. 78, 1085-
1103.
Scherpiet, S., Brühl, A.B., Opialla, S., et al., 2013. Altered emotion processing cir-
cuits during the anticipation of emotional stimuli in women with borderline 
personality disorder. Eur. Arch. Psychiatry Clin. Neurosci. 264(1), 45-60.  doi: 
10.1007/s00406-013-0444-x 
Schmahl, C.G., Vermetten, E., Elzinga, B.M., Bremner, J.D., 2004. A positron emis-
sion tomography study of memories of childhood abuse in borderline per-
sonality disorder. Biol. Psychiatry 55, 759–765.
Schore, A.N., 1997. A century after Freud's project: is a rapprochement between 
psychoanalysis and neurobiology at hand? J. Am. Psychoanal. Assoc. 45, 807-
40.
Scott, A., 2005. Encyclopedia of nonlinear science. Routledge, Taylor and Francis 
Group, New York, NY.
Shakow, D., 1980. Kent–Rosanoff association and its implications for segmental set 
theory. Schizophr. Bull. 6, 676–85.
Sheehan, D.V., Lecrubier, Y., Sheehan, K.H., et al., 1998. The Mini-International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.): the development and validation of a 
structured diagnostic psychiatric interview for DSM-IV and ICD-10. J. Clin. 
Psychiatry 59, Suppl 20, 22-33, quiz 34-57.
Singer, W., 1993. Neuronal representations, assemblies and temporal coherence. 
Prog. Brain Res. 95, 461-474.
Singer, W., 2001. Consciousness and the binding problem. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci.  929, 
123-146.
Sjostrom R., 1985. Effects of psychotherapy in schizophrenia. A retrospective study. 
Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 71, 513-522.    
Solms, M., 1997. What is consciousness? J. Am. Psychoanal. Assoc. 45, 681-703.
Solms, M., 2004. Freud returns. Sci.  Am. 290, 82-88.  
Solms, M., Saling, M., 1986. On psychoanalysis and neuroscience: Freud's attitude 
to the localizationist tradition. Int. J. Psychoanal. 67, 397-416.
Solms, M., Turnbull, O.H., 2011. What is neuropsychoanalysis? Neuropsychoanalysis
13, 133-146. 
Spitzer, C., Haug, H.J., Freyberger, H.J., 1997. Dissociative symptoms in schizo-
phrenic patients with positive and negative symptoms. Psychopathology 30(2), 
67-75.
Sporns, O, Tononi, G, Edelman, G.M., 2002. Theoretical neuroanatomy and the 
connectivity of the cerebral cortex. Behav. Brain Res. 135, 69-74.
Sporns, O., Tononi, G., Edelman, G.M., 2000. Connectivity and complexity: the rela-
tionship between neuroanatomy and brain dynamics. Neural Netw. 13, 909-22.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
76
Stephan, K.E, Friston, K.J., Frith, C.D., 2009. Dysconnection in Schizophrenia: From 
abnormal Synaptic Plasticity to Failures of Self-monitoring. Schizophr. Bull. 35, 
509-527.
Stephan, K.E., Baldeweg, T., Friston, K.J., 2006. Synaptic Plasticity and 
Dysconnection in Schizophrenia. Biol. Psychiatry 59, 929-939.
Stern, D.B., 2004. The Eye Sees Itself: Dissociation, Enactment, and the Achievement 
of Conflict. Contemp. Psychoanal. 40, 197-237.
Stern, D.B., 2009. Dissociation and Unformulated Experience: A Psychoanalytic 
Model of Mind. In: Dell, P.F., O´Neil, J.A. (Eds.) Dissociation and the dissociative 
disorders. DSM-V and Beyond. Routledge, New York, NY, pp.653-663. 
Stern, D.N., 1985. The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and 
Development. Basic Books, New York, NY.
Stone, M.H., 1988. Toward a psychobiological theory of borderline personality dis-
order: Is irritability the red thread that runs through borderline conditions? 
Dissociation 1, 2-15.
Sumiyoshi, C., Sumiyoshi, T., Nohara, S., et al., 2005. Disorganization of semantic 
memory underlies alogia in schizophrenia: An analysis of verbal fluency per-
formance in Japanese subjects. Schizophr. Res. 74, 91– 100.
Svetlak, M., Bob, P., Cernik, M., Kukleta, M., 2010. Electrodermal complexity dur-
ing the Stroop colour word test. Auton. Neurosci. 152, 101-7.
Szilard, L., 1929/1964. On the decrease of entropy in a thermodynamic system by 
the intervention of intelligent beings [In German published in 1929, Über die 
Entropieverminderung in einem thermodynamischen System bei Eingriffen 
intelligenter Wesen. Zeitschrift für Physik 53, 840–856]. In English published in 
1964, Behav. Sci. 9, 301–10.
Talvitie, V., Ihanus, J., 2011. On neuropsychoanalytic metaphysics. Int. J. Psychoanal. 
92, 1583-1601.
Tas, C., Brown, E.C., Esen-Danaci, A., Lysaker, P.H., Brüne, M., 2012. Intrinsic mo-
tivation and  metacognition as predictors of learning potential in patients 
with remitted schizophrenia. J. Psychiatr. Res. 46, 1086-92. doi:10.1016/ 
j.jpsychires.2012.04.027. 
Teicher, M., Tomoda, A., Andersen, S.L., 2006. Neurobiological consequences of 
early stress and childhood maltreatment: Are results from human and animal 
studies comparable? Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1071, 313-323. 
Tirsch, W.S., Stude, P., Scherb, H.,  Keidel, M., 2004. Temporal order of nonlinear 
dynamics in human brain. Brain Res. Rev. 45, 79-95.
Tononi, G., 2004. An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC 
Neurosci. 5, 42. 
Tononi, G., and Edelman, G.M., 2000. Schizophrenia and the mechanism of con-
scious integration. Brain Res. Rev. 31, 391-400.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
77
Tononi, G., Koch, C., 2008. The neural correlates of consciousness: an update. Ann. 
N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1124, 239-61. Erratum in: Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 2011, 1225, 200.
Tononi, G., Sporns, O., Edelman, G.M., 1994. A measure for brain complexity: relat-
ing functional segregation and integration in the nervous system. Proc.Natl. 
Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 91, 5033-7.
Trimboli, F., Farr, K., 2000. A Psychodynamic Guide for Essential Treatment Plan-
ning. Psychoanal. Psychol. 17, 336-359.
Tustin, F., 1988. The “black hole”: a significant element in autism. Free Associations
1, 35-50.
Uhlhaas, P.J., Haenschel, C., Nikolić, D., Singer, W., 2008. The role of oscillations 
and synchrony in cortical networks and their putative relevance for the path-
ophysiology of schizophrenia. Schizophr. Bull. 34, 927–43.
Uhlhaas, P.J., Singer, W., 2010. Abnormal neural oscillations and synchrony in 
schizophrenia. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 11, 100–13.
van Beilen, M., Pijnenborg, M., van Zomerenb, E.H.,  van den Bosch, R.J., Withaa, 
R.K., et al., 2004. What is measured by verbal fluency tests in schizophrenia? 
Schizophr. Res. 69: 267– 276.
Varela, F., Lachaux, J., Rodriguez, E., Martinerie, J., 2001. The brainweb: Phase syn-
chronization and large-scale integration. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 2, 229-239. 
Vermetten, E.,  Douglas, B.J., 2004. Functional brain imaging and the induction of 
traumatic recall: a cross-correlational review between neuroimaging and 
hypnosis. Int. J. Clin. Exp. Hypn. 52, 280-312.
Vinogradov, S., Kirkland, J., Poole, J.H., Drexler, M., Ober, B.A., Shenaut, G.K., 
2002. Both processing speed and semantic memory organization predict ver-
bal fluency in schizophrenia. Schizophr. Res. 8, 171–81.
Vivona, J.M., 2009. Leaping from Brain to Mind: A Critique of Mirror Neuron Ex-
planations of Countertransference. J. Am. Psychoanal. Assoc. 57, 525-550.
Vogel, M., Kuwert, P., Spitzer, C., Möller, B., Freyberger, H.J., Grabe, H.J., 2009. As-
sociation of childhood  neglect with adult dissociation in inpatients with 
schizophrenia. Psychopathology 42(2), 24-30. 
Vogel, M., Schatz, D., Spitzer, C., et al.  2009. A more proximal impact of dissocia-
tion than of trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder on schneiderian symp-
toms in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. Compr. Psychiatry 50, 128–134. 
Vogel, M., Spitzer, C., Barnow, S., Freyberger, H.J., 2006. The Role of Trauma and 
PTSD-Related Symptoms for Dissociation and Psychopathological Distress in 
Inpatients with Schizophrenia. Psychopathology 39, 236–242.
Vohs, J., Lysaker, PH. 2014. Metacognitive mastery and intrinsic motivation in 
schizophrenia. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 202, 74-77.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
78
Vohs, J.L, Lysaker, P.H., Francis, M., et al.  2014. Metacognition, social cognition, 
and symptoms in patients with first episode and prolonged psychosis. 
Schizophr. Res. 153, 54-9.
Volkenstein, M.V., 2009. Entropy and information. Birkhauser Verlag AG, Basel, 
Switzerland. 
Waller, N.G., Putnam, F.W., Carlson, E.B., 1996. Types of Dissociation and Dissocia-
tive Types: A Taxometric Analysis of Dissociative Experiences. Psychol. Meth-
ods 1(3), 300-321.
Weber, K., Miller, G.A., Schupp, H.T., et al., 2009. Early life stress and psychiatric 
disorder modulate cortical responses to affective stimuli. Psychophysiology
46(6), 1234-43. doi:10.1111/ j.1469-8986.2009.00871.x. 
Weng, G., Bhalla, U.S., Iyengar, R., 1999. Complexity in biological signaling sys-
tems. Science 284, 92-6.
Westen, D., Gabbard, G.O., 2002a. Developments in cognitive neuroscience: I. con-
flict, compromise, and connectionism. J. Am. Psychoanal. Assoc. 50, 53-98. 
Westen, D., Gabbard, G.O., 2002b. Developments in cognitive neuroscience: II. im-
plications for theories of transference. J. Am. Psychoanal. Assoc. 50, 99-134. 
Williams, L.M., Das, P., Liddell, B.J., et al., 2007. Fronto-limbic and autonomic dis-
junctions to negative emotion distinguish schizophrenia subtypes. Psychiatry 
Res. 155, 29-44.
Wing, J.K., Curtis, R.H., Beevor, A.S., 1996. HoNOS: Health of the Nation Outcome 
Scales: Report on Research and Development July 1993-December 1995. Royal Col-
lege of Psychiatrists, London.
Woods, S.W., 2003. Chlorpromazine equivalent doses for the newer atypical anti-
psychotics. J. Clin. Psychiatry 64, 663–667.
Wunderlich, U., Wiedermann, G., Buchkremer, G., 1996. Sind psychosoziale 
Interventionen bei schizophrenen Patienten wirksam? Eine Metaanalyse. 
Verhaltenstherapie 6, 4-13.
Yan, H., Tian, L., Yan, J., et al., 2012. Functional and anatomical connectivity ab-
normalities in cognitive division of anterior cingulate cortex in schizophrenia. 
PLoS One 7(9), e45659. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045659. 
Yovell, Y., 2000. Affect theory and the neurobiology of affective dysregulation. J. 
Am. Acad. Psychoanal. 28, 467-481.
Yücel, M., Brewer, W.J., Harrison, B.J., et al., 2007. Anterior cingulate activation in 
antipsychotic-naïve first-episode schizophrenia. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 115(2), 
155-8. 
Zanarini, M.C., Frankenburg, F.R., Jager-Hyman, S., et al., 2008. The course of dis-
sociation for patients with borderline personality disorder and Axis II com-
parison subjects: a 10-year follow up. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 118, 291–296. 
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
79
Zanarini, M.C., Jager-Hyman, S., 2009. Dissociation in Borderline Personality Dis-
order. In: Dell, P.F., O´Neil, J.A. (Eds.) Dissociation and the dissociative disorders. 
DSM-V and beyond. Routledge, New York, pp. 487-493.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
80
5. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 
Publication in journals with IF related to dissertation
1. Pec, O., Bob, P., Raboch, J. Dissociation in schizophrenia and borderline personality 
disorder (2014) Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment, Mar 17, 10, pp.487-91. doi: 
10.2147/NDT.S57627. IF=2.154
2. Pec, O., Bob, P., Raboch, J. Splitting in schizophrenia and borderline personality dis-
order (2014) PLoS One. Mar 6;9(3):e91228. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0091228. IF=3.534
3. Lysaker, P.H., Bob, P., Pec, O., Hamm, J., Kukula, M., Vohs, J., Popolo, R., Salvatore, 
G., Dimaggio, G. Synthetic metacognition as a link between brain and behavior in 
schizophrenia (2013) Translational Neuroscience, 4 (3), pp. 368-377. IF=0,716
Other publications in journals with IF
4. Höschl, C., Winkler, P., Pec, O. The state of psychiatry in the Czech Republic (2012) 
International Review of Psychiatry, 24(4), pp. 278-85. doi: 10.3109/ 
09540261.2012.688730.  IF=1,403
Celkový kumulativní IF=7,807
Other publications related to disertation
5. Bizik, G., Bob, P., Raboch, J., Svetlak, M., Simek, J., Pec, O., Benakova, H., Uhrova, J., 
Zima, T. Dissociation and immune dysregulation: A preliminary report (2011) Activitas 
Nervosa Superior, 53 (3-4), pp. 141-145. 
Other publications indexed in Scopus
6. Pěč, O. Setkání Skupiny Vládních Expertů k Duševnímu Zdraví (Mental Health and 
Well-Being) 19.-20.3.2013, Lucemburk (2013) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 109 (3), p. 
151. 
7. Šelepová, P., Dragomirecká, E., Pěč, O., Probstová, V., Stuchlík, J. Camberwell as-
sessment of need - An assessment of needs in severe mental illness. Outcome of a pilot 
study [Camberwellské šetření potřeb - Hodnocení potřeb závažně duševně nemocných. 
Výsledky pilotního šetření] (2012) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 108 (3), pp. 115-121. 
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
81
8. Pěč, O., Wenigová, B., Dlouhý, M., Raiter, T., Šelepová, P., Stuchlík, J., Bartoš, J. The 
regional model of mental health care in Karlovy Vary region [Regionální model péče o 
osoby s duševním onemocněním v Karlovarském kraji] (2011) Ceska a Slovenska 
Psychiatrie, 107 (5), pp. 268-275. 
9. Pěč, O. Co nás může spojovat v komunitní péči (2009) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 
105 (6-8), p. 243. 
10. Pěč, O., Čechová, D., Pěčová, J., Dragomirecká, E., Šelepová, P., Probstová, V., 
Bubela, M. HoNOS (Health of the Nations Outcome Scales) - An adaptation of the tool 
for the assessment of symptoms and social functions in serious mentally ill in the 
Czech conditions and its use [HoNOS (Hodnocení zdravotního stavu) - Adaptace 
nástroje na hodnocení symptomů a sociálních funkcí u závažně duševně nemocných v 
českých podmínkách a jeho použití] (2009) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 105 (6-8), pp. 
245-249. 
11. Pěč, O., Dlouhý, M., Wenigová, B., Raiter, T., Bašný, Z., Stuchlík, J., Struk, P., 
Šelepová, P., Šístková, V., Vepřek, P. Model of care for mentally ill in Prague and its 
economic evaluation, the use for the region of Karlovy Vary [Model péče o duševně 
nemocné v Praze a jeho ekonomické vyhodnocení, využití pro Karlovarský kraj] (2009) 
Psychiatrie, 13 (2-3), pp. 68-73. 
12. Pěč, O., Wenigová, B., Raiter, T., Bašný, Z., Dlouhý, M., Stuchlík, J., Struk, P., 
Šelepová, P., Šístková, V., Vepřek, P. Needs of professionals and users of psychiatric 
care for creating a model of services for mentally ill in Prague [Potřeby odborníků a 
uživatelů psychiatrické péče pro vytvoření modelu služeb pro duševně nemocné v 
Praze] (2009) Psychiatrie, 13 (1), pp. 10-14. 
13. Pěč, O. XXX. Jubilejní konference sociální psychiatrie (2009) Ceska a Slovenska 
Psychiatrie, 105 (1), pp. 43-44. 
14. Pěč, O., Dragomirecká, E., Čechová, D., Pěčová, J. Changes in vocational and social 
inclusion in patients discharged from day treatment program for treatment of psychot-
ic patients [Změny v pracovně sociálním začlenění u pacientů propuštěných z denního 
stacionáře pro léčbu psychóz] (2008) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 104 (7), pp. 343-
349. 
15. Pěč, O. Sympozium sociální psychiatrie (2008) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 104 
(2), pp. 98-99. 
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
82
16. Pěč, O. Návrh novelizace Koncepce oboru psychiatrie z pohledu komunitní péče o 
duševně nemocné (2008) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 104 (2), pp. 78-84.
17. Stuchlík, J., Pfeiffer, J., Pěč, O. Audit of the Rights and Ethical Aspects of the Care in 
psychiatric Hospitals [APEL - Audit Práv a Etiky Léčby v psychiatrických léčebnách]
(2004) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 100 (3), pp. 140-147. 
18. Lorenc, J., Pěč, O., Koblic, K., Beránková, A. Crisis Intervention and Crisis Services 
[Krizová intervence a krizové služby] (2003) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 99 (SUPPL. 
2), pp. 27-30. 
19. Praško, J., Johanovská, E., Klár, I., Pěč, O., Ondráčková, I., Šípek, J., Prašková, H.
Cognitive-behavioral Therapy and Pharmacotherapy in the Treatment of Patients Suf-
fering with Unipolar Recurrent Depression [Kognitivně behaviorální terapie a 
farmakoterapie v léčbě hospitalizovaných pacientů trpicich unipolární rekurentní 
depresí] (2003) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 99 (SUPPL. 2), pp. 103-105. 
20. Pěč, O., Koblic, K., Lorenc, J., Beránková, A. Day Clinics with Psychotherapeutic 
Care [Denní stacionáře s psychoterapeutickou péčí] (2003) Ceska a Slovenska 
Psychiatrie, 99 (SUPPL. 2), pp. 10-16. 
21. Kitzlerová, E., Pěč, O., Raboch, J., Howardová, A., Stárková, L., Baková, N., Sekot, 
M., Peichlová, J. Survey of day hospitals in the Czech Republic [Mapovaní denních 
stacionářů v České republice] (2003) Ceska a Slovenska Psychiatrie, 99 (6), pp. 299-305. 
22. Pěč, O., Pfeiffer, J. Deinstitutionalization of psychiatric care: the post-war process in 
developed countries [Desinstitucionalizace psychiatrické péce: poválečný proces ve 
vyspělých státech.] (1994) Cesko-Slovenska Psychiatrie, 90 (1), pp. 34-47. 
23. Baudis, P., Probstová, V., Pfeiffer, J., Klaschka, J., Benes, M., Pěč, O. Development of 
psychiatric disability in psychotics and their rehabilitation [Vývoj psychiatrické inva-
lidity psychotiků a rehabilitace.] (1991) Cesko-Slovenska Psychiatrie, 87 (3-4), pp. 168-
173. 
Books, chapters in books
24. Baudiš, P., Probstová, V., Pfeiffer, J., Klaschka, J., Beneš, M., Pěč, O.: Předpověď 
vývoje psychiatrické invalidity u psychotiků. „Zprávy“ č.98. Praha: Psychiatrické cen-
trum, 1991. 82 s. 
25. Probstová, V., Dragomirecká, E., Šelepová, P., Kalvoda, H., Sochorová, G.,  Pěč, O.: 
Manuál CAN: Camberwellské šetření potřeb. Komplexní metoda šetření potřeb 
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
83
závažně duševně nemocných. Praha: Centrum pro rozvoj péče o duševní zdraví, 2006. 
ISBN 80-239-8056-4.
26. Pěč, O., Šelepová, P., Čechová D., Pěčová, J., Dragomirecká E., Probstová, V., 
Bubela, M.: HoNOS: Hodnocení zdravotního stavu. Health of the Nation Outcome 
Scales (manuál české verze). Praha: Centrum pro rozvoj péče o duševní zdraví, 2007. 50 
stran. ISBN 978-80-254-1182-7.
27. Mammone, I., Fuda, F., Maone, A., De Luca, S., Bumbaca, C., Pierucci, M., 
Langmead, K., Grayden, J., McKay, E., Farrell C. van Dam, M., Ruiter, L., Probstová, V., 
Pěč, O., Kačírková P., Zeibote, S., Dzonsa, D., Symeonides, N., Chadoulis, G., Rezza, G., 
Morosini, P.L.: Resource Kit. Per l´operatore psyichiatrico di comunitá. Roma: Istituto 
Superiore di Sanita, 2008. 162 s.
28. Pěč, O., Probstová, V. (eds.) Psychózy. Psychoterapie, rehabilitace a komunitní péče. 
Praha: Triton, 2009. 264 s. ISBN 978-80-7387-253-3.
29. Podhajská, J., Černá, P. Tomášová, B. Suková, M., Pěč, O.: Aktivní začleňování osob 
s duševní poruchou prostřednictvím multidisciplinárních týmů. Praha: ESET-HELP, 
2011, 35 str. ISBN 978-80-254-9680-0.
30. Probstová, V., Šelepová, P., Dragomirecká E., Kalvoda, H., Sochofová, G., Pěč, P. 
CAN: Camberwellské hodnocení potřeb. 2.aktualizované vydání. Praha: Centrum pro 
rozvoj péče o duševní zdraví, 2011. ISBN: 978-80-260.0138-6.
31. Čechová, D., Dragomirecká, E., Pěčová J., Pěč, O., Šelepová, P. Dotazník 
spokojenosti s péčí. 1.vydání. Praha : Centrum pro rozvoj péče o duševní zdraví, 2011, 
23 str. ISBN: 978-80-260-1312-9.
32. Probstová, V., Pfeiffer, J., Pěč, O.: 10 let cesty k moderní péči o dlouhodobě duševně 
nemocné v ČR / The Ten Yaer Long Road to Modern Care For Long-Term Mental 
Health Patients in the Czech Republic, In: Dragomirecká, E., Palčová, A., Papežová, H 
(eds.). Sociální psychiatrie v čase změn / Social Psychiatry in Changing Times, Praha: 
Psychiatrické centrum Praha, 2000. ISBN 80-85121-08-5, str.199-202.  
33. Pěč O. Náklady péči o duševně nemocné v roce 2001. In: Transformace oboru 
psychiatrie, Sborník semináře, Praha: Amepra. 2003ISBN 80-86694-04-6 , str. 33-44.
34. Pěč, O., Vachková, L., Mužík, J. Rehabilitace v oblasti sociálních a pracovních 
funkcí. In Kolář, P. et al. (eds.) Rehabilitace v klinické praxi. Praha: Galén, 2009. ISBN
978-80-7262-657-1, str. 663-670.
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
84
35. Hošková, M., Junek, P., Koblic, K. Pěč, O., Růžičková, I., Vrba, L. Skupinová analýza 
a nové české pojmy ve skupinové psychoterapii. In Růžička, J. (ed.) Komunitní a 
skupinová psychoterapie v české perspektivě. Praha: Triton, 2011. ISBN 978-80-7387-
467-4, str. 155-176.
36. Pěč, O. Potřeby a ohrožení lidí s duševním onemocněním. In Kalvach, Z., Čeledová, 
L, Holmerová, I., Jirák, R., Zavázalová, H., Wija P.a kol. Křehký pacient a primární 
péče. Praha: Grada, 2011. ISBN 978-80-247-4026-3, str. 78-80.
37. Pěč, O. Komunitní péče o duševně nemocné. In Kalvach, Z., Čeledová, L, 
Holmerová, I., Jirák, R., Zavázalová, H., Wija P.a kol. Křehký pacient a primární péče. 
Praha: Grada, 2011ISBN 978-80-247-4026-3, str. 212-215.
38. Pěč, O., Vachková, L., Mužík, J. Rehabilitation in the areas of social and vocational 
functions. In P.Kolář et al. Clinical Rehabilitation. First edition. Praha: Alena Kobesová, 
2013. ISBN 978-80-905438-0-5, str. 717-725. 
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
85
6. PUBLISHED ARTICLES 
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
86
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
87
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
88
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
89
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
90
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
91
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
92
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
93
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
94
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
95
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
96
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
97
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
98
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
99
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
100
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
101
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
102
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
103
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
104
O. Pěč – Splitting and Dissociation in Schizophrenia 
105
7. LIST OF ABBREVIATION
BPD - borderline personality disorder (hraniční porucha osobnosti)
DES-  Dissociative Experiences Scale (škála disociativních zkušeností)
DES-AB - factor of absorption in DES (faktor absorbce na škále DES)
DES-AM - factor of amnesia in DES (faktor amnézie na škále DES)
DES-DD - factor for depersonalization/derealization of DES (faktor depersonalizace / 
derealizace na škále DES)
EC - day dosages of antipsychotic medication in equivalents of chlorpromazine (denní 
dávky antipsychotické medikace v ekvivalentech chlorpromazinu)
EDA - electrodermal activity (elektrodermální aktivita)
EEG- electroencephalogram (elektroencefalogram)
fMRI- functional magnetic resonance imaging (funkční magnetická rezonance)
HoNOS - Health of the Nation Outcome Scales (škála Hodnocení zdravotního stavu)
HoNOS(E)- version for external evaluation of HoNOS (HoNOS, verze pro externí 
hodnotitele)
HoNOS(S) - self-rating version of HoNOS (sebehodnotící škála HoNOS)
M.I.N.I. - Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview
NMDA- N-metyl-D-aspartic acid (kyselina N-metyl-D-aspartátová)
PDP - parallel distributed processing (paralelní distribuované zpracování)
PET- positron emission tomography (pozitronová emisní tomografie)
SI - Splitting Index (index štěpení)
SI(F) – Splitting Index, factor of  family (index štěpení, faktor rodiny)
SI(O) – Splitting Index, factor of others (index štěpení, factor ostatních)
SI(S) – Splitting Index, factor of self (index štěpení, faktor self)
TSC-40 - Trauma Symptom Checklist (dotazník pro zjišťování traumatické zkušenosti)
VF- verbal fluency (verbální fluence)
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SOUHRN
Pojem štěpení je definován jako proces, při kterém se tvoří agregované sou-
bory psychických elementů, které není možné vzájemně propojit pro neslučitelnou 
psychickou zkušenost.  Soubory pak vytvářejí mnohočetná  dělení uvnitř psychic-
kého aparátu. Současné poznatky ukazují, že psychické štěpení u schizofrenie se 
pravděpodobně specificky projevuje  na neurální úrovni jako narušení organizace 
v neurální komunikaci. Narušená neurální komunikace je zřejmě podkladem defi-
citů v oblasti psychického zpracování, které popisuje řada neurovědních konceptů 
jako jsou například teorie narušené konektivity, souběžných výbojů a dynamické 
komplexity. V této souvislosti je cílem teoretické části disertační práce popsat hlav-
ní neurovědní teorie, které komplementárně odrážejí vzájemně propojené procesy 
mezi psychickou a mozkovou činností,  které jsou základem poruch mentální inte-
grace  a které pravděpodobně představují neurální reprezentace štěpení u schi-
zofrenie.
Účelem první části empirického výzkumu bylo ozřejmit vztahy mezi psycho-
logickým procesem štěpení a narušenými kognitivními a afektivními funkcemi u 
schizofrenie. Jako kontrolní skupina byl použit vzorek pacientů s hraniční poru-
chou osobnosti (HPO).
Metody: V rámci klinické studie jsme vyšetřovali 30 pacientů se schizofrenií a 
35 pacientů s HPO. Symptomy štěpení byly měřeny za použití sebemonitorovací 
škály index štěpení  (Splitting Index - SI). Pro ohodnocení stupně desorganizace 
sémantické paměti jsme použili test verbální fluence. Další psychopatologické 
symptomy byly vyšetřovány s použitím nástroje Hodnocení zdravotního stavu 
(Health of the Nation Outcome Scale  - HoNOS). 
Výsledky: Hlavní výsledky ukázaly, že index štěpení SI je signifikantně vyšší 
u HPO než u schizofrenie a na druhou stranu je verbální fluence signifikantně nižší 
ve skupině pacientů se schizofrenií. Psychopatologické symptomy měřené HoNOS 
byly signifikantně vyšší ve skupině s HPO než u schizofrenie. Signifikantní kore-
lační vztahy byly nalezeny mezi verbální fluencí a „faktorem ostatních“ na škále SI 
(Spearman r =-0.52, p, 0.01) u schizofrenních pacientů. 
Závěr: Proces štěpení je odlišný u schizofrenie a HPO. U pacientů s HPO ště-
pení ústí do psychické nestability, zatímco u schizofrenie psychická fragmentace 
vede k asociačnímu štěpení, které lze sledovat v nízkých skórech verbální fluence. 
Tento závěr je v zásadě ve shodě s Bleulerovým historickým konceptem štěpení u 
schizofrenie. 
Ve druhé části empirického výzkumu jsme zvažovali pravděpodobnou klíčo-
vou roli disociace u schizofrenie. Současně jsme vycházeli také z toho, že podobnou 
roli může mít disociace také u hraniční poruchy osobnosti (HPO). Zároveň jsme 
zjistili, že studie, které by srovnávaly specifické projevy disociace u schizofrenie a 
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HPO jsou velmi řídké. V této souvislosti bylo účelem studie vyšetřit výskyt disocia-
tivních a dalších psychopatologických symptomů u schizofrenie a srovnat přítom-
nost těchto symptomů s jejich výskytem u HPO. Dalším cílem bylo zjistit možný 
vliv medikace antipsychotiky na symptomy disociace. 
Metody: Vyšetřovali jsme 31 pacientů se schizofrenií a 36 pacientů s HPO. 
Symptomy disociace byly měřeny škálou disociativních zkušenosti (Dissociative 
Experiences Scale - DES). Symptomy vztažné ke stresu a traumatickým zkušenos-
tem byly hodnoceny dotazníkem pro zjišťování traumatické zkušenosti (Trauma 
Symptom Checklist-40 - TSC-40) a další psychopatologické symptomy škálou Hod-
nocení zdravotního stavu (Health of the Nation Outcome Scales  - HoNOS). U 
všech pacientů jsme také vyšetřovali aktuální denní dávky antipsychotické medi-
kace v ekvivalentech chlorpromazinu. 
Výsledky: Výsledky ukázaly, že symptomy traumatického stresu měřené 
TSC-40 mají signifikantně vyšší skóre ve skupině s HPO. Zjištěné údaje rovněž 
ukázaly, že disociativní symptomy (DES) byly signifikantně korelovány se sym-
ptomy traumatického stresu (TSC-40) a se symptomy hodnocenými na škále Ho-
NOS. Výrazně signifikantní korelace jsme shledali mezi úrovní antipsychotické 
medikace a komponentou depersonalizace / derealizace na škále DES u pacientů 
s HPO.
Závěr: Výsledky podporují důležitou roli disociačních procesů u schizofrenie 
a HPO  a naznačují signifikantní vztah mezi projevy disociace u HPO a antipsycho-
tickou medikací. 
V dalším výzkumu bychom chtěli využít těsné souvislosti mezi koncepcí ště-
pení u schizofrenie a deficitní syntetickou metakognicí. Syntetická metakognice ja-
ko psychický proces je schopností lidské mysli syntetizovat záměry, myšlenky, po-
city a vztahy mezi událostmi a integrovat je do větších komplexních reprezentací 
včetně reflexivních funkcí (myšlení o myšlení). Syntetickou metakognici lze měřit 
analýzou diskurzu za použití standardizovaných postupů.  
Klíčová slova: štěpení, disociace, metakognice, schizofrenie, hraniční porucha 
osobnosti, antipsychotika 
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SUMMARY
The term splitting is defined as a process of formation of mental aggregates 
linked incompatible experiences producing numerous divisions in mental appa-
ratus. Current findings indicate that psychological splitting in schizophrenia is 
likely specifically presented on a neural level as disrupted organization in neural 
communication. This disrupted neural communication likely underlies deficits in 
mental processing described by various neuroscientific concepts such as theories 
of disturbed connectivity, corollary discharges and dynamic complexity. In this 
context, a purpose of the theoretical part of the dissertation is to describe basic 
neuroscience theories that complementarily reflect interrelated processes be-
tween mind and brain underlying disturbances of mental integration that likely 
present a neural representation of the splitting.
A purpose of the first part of the empirical research was to examine relation-
ships between psychological process of splitting and disturbed cognitive and af-
fective functions in schizophrenia.  A sample of patients with borderline person-
ality disorder (BPD) was used as a control group in this study. 
Methods: In the clinical study, we have assessed 30 patients with schizophre-
nia and 35 patients with BPD. The symptoms of splitting were measured using 
self-reported Splitting Index (SI). As a measure of semantic memory disorganiza-
tion we have used verbal fluency test. Other psychopathological symptoms were 
assessed using Health of the Nation Outcome Scale  (HoNOS).
Results: Main results show that SI is significantly higher in BPD group than in 
schizophrenia, and on the other hand, verbal fluency is significantly lower in 
schizophrenia group. Psychopathological symptoms measured by HoNOS are 
significantly higher in the BPD group than in schizophrenia. Significant relation-
ship was found between verbal fluency and the SI ‘‘factor of others’’ (Spearman r 
=-0.52, p,0.01) in schizophrenia patients.
Conclusions: Processes of splitting are different in schizophrenia and BPD. In 
BPD patients splitting results to mental instability, whereas in schizophrenia the 
mental fragmentation leads to splitting of associations observed as lower scores 
of verbal fluency, which in principle is in agreement with Bleuler’s historical 
concept of splitting in schizophrenia.
In the second part of the empirical research we have considered that dissocia-
tion likely plays a key role in schizophrenia. Simultaneously we have found out 
that similar role dissociation could play also in borderline personality disorder 
(BPD), but empirical studies that compare specific manifestations of dissociation 
in schizophrenia and BPD are rare. In this context, the purpose of the study was 
to assess the occurrence of dissociative and other psychopathological symptoms 
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in schizophrenia and to compare the presence of these symptoms with BPD. A 
further aim was to assess the possible influence of antipsychotic medication on 
the dissociative symptoms.
Methods: We assessed 31 patients with schizophrenia and 36 patients with 
BPD. Dissociative symptoms were measured by the Dissociative Experiences 
Scale (DES), symptoms related to stress and traumatic experiences were assessed 
using the Trauma Symptom Checklist-40 (TSC-40), and other psychopathological 
symptoms were measured with the Health of the Nation Outcome Scales 
(HoNOS). We also assessed actual daily doses of antipsychotic medication in 
chlorpromazine equivalents in all participants.
Results: The results show that symptoms of traumatic stress measured by the 
TSC-40 had significantly higher scores in the BPD group. The data also show that 
dissociative symptoms (DES) were significantly correlated with symptoms of 
traumatic stress (TSC-40) and with symptoms assessed by the HoNOS. Remark-
ably significant correlations were found between levels of antipsychotic medica-
tion and the DES and between antipsychotic medication and the depersonaliza-
tion /derealization component of the DES in BPD patients.
Conclusion: The results support an important role of dissociative processes in 
schizophrenia and BPD and suggest a significant relationship between manifes-
tations of dissociative symptoms in BPD and antipsychotic medication.
In future research might be of interest to assess relationship between the con-
cept of splitting in schizophrenia and deficit synthetic metacognition. The syn-
thetic metacognition as a psychological process is capable to synthetisize inten-
tions, thoughts, feelings, and connections between events, and to integrate them 
into larger complex representations of self and others including also a reflection 
about that larger representation that involves reflexive functions (thinking about 
thinking). Synthetic metacognition is measurable by analyzing discourse using 
standardized procedures. 
Key words: splitting, dissociation, metacognition, schizophrenia, borderline 
personality disorder, antipsychotic medication
